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A BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT ENFORCEMENT
ERIN SHELEY*
The law of sexual assault is in conflict. Jurisdictions struggle with the
conceptual shift from thinking of rape as forcible sex to a broader
understanding that turns on the meaning of consent. Due to resource,
evidentiary, and reporting problems there is a mismatch between the new
substantive understanding of sexual assault and its actual enforcement. This
has led to something of a cultural war by survivors and many women
generally against the idea of “rape culture,” which runs the risk of
categorizing all sexualized or gendered speech and much of male behavior
as implicitly rape-supportive. This article proposes that lessons from broken
windows policing can assist prosecutors in addressing the expressive gap
between the law’s definition of sexual assault and the current realities of
under-enforcement and victim disempowerment. I suggest that enforcement
of existing laws against the lower level street harassment of women, on the
occasions it already meets the elements of assault or sexual assault, will
likely have two positive effects. First, while the efficacy of broken windows
theory is hotly debated, to the extent that aggressive enforcement of lower
level crimes of disorder does translate into a reduction in more serious
offenses, more convictions for street harassment may result in a longer-term
reduction in more serious sexual assaults that are much harder to detect and
prove. Second, and perhaps more importantly, aggressive prosecution of
even “harmless” non-consensual street harassment would help to resolve the
expressive problems surrounding the law’s definition of non-consensual sex
more broadly. This would combat—more concretely and less divisively—the
norm of default access to female bodies than the amorphous, extra-legal
critique of “rape culture” has thus far.

* Assistant Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Many thanks to the
participants in the 2017 Federalist Society Junior Scholars Workshop (and particularly to John
Pfaff) for their useful feedback on this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of sexual assault is in an expressive crisis. Social media has
raised awareness of how easily even acquaintances may sexually violate a
woman,1 and the newly-elected U.S. President is on tape endorsing it.2 At
the same time, many jurisdictions have adopted broader definitions of sexual
assault to match reality, shifting away from the traditional conception of rape

1

See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape that Social Media
Brought to Light, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/
us/teenagers-found-guilty-in-rape-in-steubenville-ohio.html.
2
Penn Bullock, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html.
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as forcible sex, to one based on lack of consent.3 Yet police departments and
prosecutors struggle with the new doctrinal shift.4 Due to resource,
evidentiary, and reporting problems, there is a mismatch between the new
substantive understanding of sexual assault and its actual enforcement. This
has contributed to something of a cultural war waged by survivors (and many
women generally) against “rape culture.”5 While it sheds valuable light on
the relationship between misogynistic cultural attitudes and sexual violence,
the war on rape culture also runs the risk of indiscriminately categorizing all
sexualized or gendered speech and much of male behavior as implicitly rapesupportive.
This article proposes that lessons from the so-called “Broken Windows”
theory of policing can assist prosecutors and lawmakers in addressing the gap
between the law’s definition of sexual assault and the current realities of
under-enforcement and victim disempowerment. The key hypothesis of
Broken Windows theory is that the appearance of order gained by cracking
down on misdemeanors will create the reality of order and reduce more
serious violent crimes. This claim remains controversial, even thirty years
after Rudolph Giuliani famously relied on it to clean up the streets of New
York City.6 Empirical scholars disagree on the theory’s efficacy and police
have used racially suspect means to apply it.7
Nonetheless, the interaction between appearance and reality posited by
Broken Windows has unique explanatory power in the area of rape law.
Inadequate sexual assault enforcement is, as I will demonstrate, a cyclical
problem with four phases: weak cultural norms, under-enforcement, victim
disempowerment, and underreporting. I suggest that prosecutors, police, and
lawmakers must aggressively target lower level street harassment of women,
on the occasions it already meets the elements of assault. While the instances
where a harasser can be shown to have the intent of putting his victim in
immediate apprehension of unwanted touching may be a minority of all
3

See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, Criminal Law: “No” Still Means “Yes”: The
Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1084 (2011).
4
See, e.g., THOMAS E. PEREZ & MICHAEL W. COTTER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RE: THE
UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE MISSOULA POLICE DEPARTMENT 6 (May 15, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/22/missoulapdfind_5-1513.pdf.
5
See Emilie Buchwald et al., Are We Really Living in a Rape Culture?, in TRANSFORMING
RAPE CULTURE vii (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
6
See George L. Kelling, How New York Became Safe: The Full Story, CITY J. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) (2009), http://www.city-journal.org/html/how-new-york-became-safe-full-story13197.html.
7
See infra Section II.A and accompanying footnotes.
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harassment cases generally, they are frequent enough that the state can send
an important expressive message by prosecuting them as simple assault or
other related offenses.
This should have two positive effects. First, if the proponents of the
strong view of Broken Windows are correct that enforcing lower level laws
does reduce more serious offenses, then punishing street harassment may,
over the long term, reduce the more serious sexual assaults that are much
harder to detect and prove. Second, if the critics of Broken Windows are
right—if all we get from Broken Windows policing are fewer “broken
windows”—that would still be uniquely beneficial in the context of sexual
assault due to the high symbolic value of street harassment. Aggressive
prosecution of even “harmless” non-consensual street harassment would help
resolve the law’s broader expressive problem with categorizing nonconsensual sex. Even if it did not directly deter serious sexual assault, it
would help combat the norm of default access to female bodies more
concretely and less divisively than the amorphous, extra-legal critique of
“rape culture” has thus far. It would also encourage victims to report more
serious offenses by showing that the state cares about prosecuting them. All
of these effects would serve, indirectly, to reduce the incidence of sexual
assault.
This article will proceed in five parts. In Part I, I identify and explain
the cyclical relationship between the appearance and reality of states underenforcing the sexual assault laws. In Part II, I introduce Broken Windows
theory and its critics and propose a framework for evaluating its efficacy in
the context of sexual assault. In Part III, I describe the problem of street
harassment and the harms it causes and suggest its sociological and legal
relationship to sexual assault. In Part IV, I argue that Broken Windows
theory holds promise for sexual assault enforcement and propose that
prosecutors prioritize charges against street harassers in order to improve
their inadequate enforcement of sexual assault laws. I also consider
counterarguments. In Part V, I conclude.
I. THE RAPE CYCLE
It has become something of a truism that rape is under-reported and
under-prosecuted. This section reviews the various data on these claims and
explores the problems contributed by doctrinal confusion over the definition
of rape and cultural mythologies about sex and gender. It concludes that the
appearance of under-enforcement has contributed to under-reporting, and
that the resulting expressive crisis has had a negative impact on relevant
cultural norms—which have in turn contributed to under-enforcement in a
kind of vicious cycle.
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A. UNDER-ENFORCEMENT

In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued findings following
its investigation of the Missoula, Montana Police Department (MPD) for
under-enforcement of the law in cases of sexual violence.8 Operating under
the authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 14141—allowing the federal
government to bring suit against unconstitutional patterns of policing—the
DOJ targeted the MPD after a series of local news reports detailed its
systemic law enforcement failure when it came to sex crimes.9 The DOJ
identified MPD policies such as “discouraging female victims of sexual
assault from cooperating with law enforcement” due, in part, to “stereotypes
and misinformation about women and victims of sexual assault.”10 The
report concluded that the MPD’s systematic under-enforcement of the sexual
assault laws, particularly in cases of non-stranger rape, constituted a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.11
The DOJ noted that victims may have been routinely deterred from
seeking prosecution by being asked at the outset whether they wished to
proceed criminally. “Such a question,” the report noted,
may send the message that if she proceeds with her case she will be expected to be the
driving force behind the prosecution; that she should already feel sufficiently wellinformed and empowered to make the decision as to whether to seek prosecution; or
that she should feel personally responsible for imposing serious criminal consequences
12
on the assailant.

Furthermore, the report noted that the MPD failed to employ certain
techniques relevant to proving the crucial element of lack of consent in
alcohol-facilitated assaults.13 Such omissions included collecting evidence,
interviewing witnesses, and questioning suspects.14 Eventually, the MPD
8

See generally PEREZ & COTTER, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Gwen Florio, Student Says She was Sexually Assaulted by UM Football
Players; County Filed No Charges, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 21, 2011), http://missoulian.com/
news/local/student-says-she-was-sexually-assaulted-by-um-football-players/article_
5fd79f90-2b8f-11e1-a73a-0019bb2963f4.html; Gwen Florio, Missoula Police: 2nd Attack
May Be Linked to Alleged Sex Assault Involving UM Football Players, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 20,
2011), http://missoulian.com/news/local/missoula-police-nd-attack-may-be-linked-to-alle
ged-sex/article_d261cb6e-2aca-11e1-9033-0019bb2963f4.html; Gwen Florio¸ 3 UM Football
Players Allegedly Involved in Sexual Assault on Campus, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://missoulian.com/news/local/um-football-players-allegedly-involved-in-sexual-assaulton-campus/article_265fbee2-27a6-11e1-8834-0019bb2963f4.html.
10
PEREZ & COTTER, supra note 4, at 6.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 8–9.
13
Id. at 7.
14
Id. at 8.
9

SHELEY

460

6/5/18 1:52 PM

SHELEY

[Vol. 108

settled with the government and agreed to modify its policies to implement
best practices to combat gender bias consistent with the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policy on Investigating Sexual
Assaults.15
As a vindication of the Equal Protection Clause’s promise of genderneutral state law enforcement protection, the Missoula settlement has been
heralded as coming “as close as any intervention since Reconstruction to
addressing the framers’ core concern with underenforcement.”16 It is,
however, only a very early inroad into a problem that has become a truism in
criminal justice circles: most victims fail to report sexual assaults.17 The DOJ
estimates that, among eighteen to twenty-four-year-old women, only 20% of
college students and 32% of non-college students report these crimes.18 Of
those numbers, one in five of the non-college students surveyed stated that
they did not report because they believed that “police would or could not do
anything to help.”19
While these bleak numbers have been controversial, they are consistent
with other literature on sexual assault investigations around the country,
which reveal a pervasive failure of law enforcement and prosecutors’ offices
to pursue reported sexual assaults.20 Empirical literature suggests that
15

Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Justice and
the City of Missoula Regarding the Missoula Police Department’s Response to Sexual Assault
1–4 (May 13, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/15/
missoulapdsettle_5-15-13.pdf.
16
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1287, 1287 (2016).
17
See, e.g., Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of
Rape Victimization: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, NAT’L INST.
JUST. 34 (Oct. 24, 2013) (finding that 80.9% of rape survivors do not report their assault to the
police).
18
See SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013 1, 5 (2014), https://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf.
19
Id. at 9.
20
See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV.,
POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY: A
COLLABORATIVE STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2012); Justin Fenton, City Rape Statistics, Investigations Draw Concern,
BALT. SUN (June 27, 2010), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-md-ci-rapes-20100519story.html (reporting that the police investigated only four out of ten emergency rape calls
between the years 2003–2010); Jeremy Kohler, What Rape?: Abused by the System, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 28, 2005), http://dartcenter.org/content/what-rape; Todd Lighty et al.,
Few Arrests, Convictions in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, CHI. TRIB. (June 16, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-16/news/ct-met-campus-sexual-assaults-0617-
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prosecutors are more likely to see rape cases as “winnable” when they fit the
model of so-called “real rape” (for example, when the assailant used a
weapon or there was at least evidence of use of force).21 Furthermore, juries
are four times more likely to convict when a sexual assault involves factors
such as stranger assailants, multiple assailants, or violence.22 While some of
that disparity may be explained on purely evidentiary grounds—cases of
violent rape generally leave more physical evidence and make intentionality
easier to prove—the evidence suggests that judges and juries reach
disproportionately divergent conclusions in non-aggravated sexual assault
cases.23 According to Kalven and Zeisel’s landmark study of the American
jury, in 88% of aggravated sexual assault cases, judges and juries reach the
same verdict of guilty; yet, they agree only 40% of the time in other sexual
assault cases.24 In other words, in cases where women could be perceived as
in some way contributing to their victimization, judges found guilt but juries
did not.25
It should be noted that there are many reasons other than gender
stereotypes that could explain why law enforcement may fail to pursue these
cases. One is the now-famous “rape kit backlog,” which currently thwarts
the potential discovery of DNA evidence in approximately 400,000 cases
across the country.26 According to a recent National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
study, 18% of the unsolved alleged sexual assaults occurring from 2002–
2007 involved forensic evidence collected but never submitted for DNA
analysis.27 Clearly, given the centrality of DNA evidence to proof of sexual
assault, more funding for police departments and crime labs would improve
the clearance rates for sex offenses.
That said, Congress has addressed the public indignation over the rape
kit backlog with funds. In 2004, it enacted the Debbie Smith Act (which was
20110616_1_convictions-arrests-assault-cases; The Criminal Justice System: Statistics,
RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (analyzing FBI data to
conclude that of every 310 reported rapes only fifty-seven lead to an arrest). For a more
detailed review of this literature, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 1294–96.
21
See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 18–19 (1987); Wayne A. Kerstetter, Gateway to
Justice: Police and Prosecutorial Response to Sexual Assaults Against Women, 81 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 267, 301, 305 (1990).
22
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 252–53 (1971).
23
Id. at 253.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 252 n.14.
26
Caitlin Dickson, How the U.S. Ended up With 400,000 Untested Rape Kits, DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/23/how-the-u-sended-up-with-400-000-untested-rape-kits.html.
27
NANCY RITTER, THE ROAD AHEAD: UNANALYZED EVIDENCE IN SEXUAL ABUSE CASES,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. 1 (May 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/233279.pdf.
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reauthorized in 2008 and 2014), allocating funds for states to test DNA
samples and crime scene analysis, as well as to incorporate DNA analysis
into state databases linked to the National DNA Index System.28
Furthermore, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013
incorporated the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Registry (SAFER) Act,
which created incentives for local jurisdictions to audit their rape kit backlog
and hire new staff to process it.29 Despite these federal efforts, only
seventeen states have introduced measures to address their backlogs.30 As
Deborah Tuerkheimer has noted of a recent Detroit study:
Contrary to conventional wisdom, police officers repeatedly indicated that the failure
to submit a rape kit for testing was indicative of a decision not to pursue the case, rather
than a decision to pursue it without additional corroboration. Put differently, the kits
31
were shelved because the allegations had already been disregarded.

At the very least there seems to be some evidence of state entities deprioritizing the pursuit of sexual assault allegations, particularly those lacking
evidence of obvious violence.
B. DEFINITIONAL AND EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS

The most fundamental evidentiary problems at the heart of sexual
assault enforcement may relate less to flawed police practices than to the
substantive definition of sexual assault. The ambiguity of what constitutes a
sexual assault—coupled with the classic he said/she said credibility choice at
the heart of many non-stranger rape fact patterns—has been challenging for
prosecutors.
At common law, “force” was an element of rape, meaning that the state
needed to show that the accused had had “carnal knowledge of a woman
forcibly and against her will.”32 That requirement remains the touchstone of
the law in sixteen of the U.S. states requiring a showing of “forcible
compulsion” or at least “incapacity to consent.”33 However over time, more
28

42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012).
Pub. L. No. 113–4, 127 Stat. 54 (Mar. 7, 2013).
30
See Graceann Carimico et al., Rape and Sexual Assault, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 359,
368 (2016) (citing Soraya Chemaly, How Many of the Hundreds of Thousands of Untested
Rape Kits in the US Are in Your City?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/how-many-of-the-uss-40000_b_5845052.
html).
31
Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 1296–97 (citing REBECCA CAMPBELL ET AL, NAT’L
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., THE DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT (SAK) ACTION
RESEARCH PROJECT (ARP) FINAL REPORT 121 (2015)).
32
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 210 (1765).
33
Decker & Baroni, supra note 3, at 1085–86. Massachusetts is the sole state of that
number specifically requiring compulsion. Id. at 1086.
29
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and more states began to adopt a definition of sexual assault based on the
victim’s lack of consent, as opposed to the defendant’s show of force. John
Decker and Peter Baroni provide a useful taxonomy of these developing new
standards.34 The twenty-eight “true non-consent states” have at least one sex
offense on the books that can be proven by showing that the victim did not
consent to the sexual act.35 Of these, seventeen have non-consent provisions
for sexual penetration offenses, while the other eleven have non-consent
provisions for offenses involving sexual contact with the victim’s intimate
parts.36 Nine “contradictory non-consent states” have laws drafted to suggest
that the elements of a sex offense statute are met when a victim does not
affirmatively consent to the act.37 As Decker and Baroni point out, though,
these states define “consent” in such a way that negates the purpose of
requiring affirmative consent: “To establish a ‘lack of consent’ in
contradictory states, the prosecution must show either the use of forcible
compulsion or a victim’s incapacity to consent. Requiring force or a lack of
capacity to consent completely negates the purpose of including a nonconsent provision.”38
Commentators have criticized the status quo for failing to criminalize
pure non-consensual sex across the board.39 As Decker and Baroni put it,
“[a] victim, frozen with fear, who fails to express approval by words or
actions should have that decision protected by the criminal justice system.”40
They also criticize the lack of criminal sanction for those who obtain sex
through deception, at least where there is a specific intent to achieve the sex.41
In contrast, Donald Dripps fears that shifting the standard away from the
force requirement and towards consent will fail as a pragmatic matter.42 He
argues that juries will never appropriately apply the consent standard in fact
due to tension between “elite opinion,” which values sexual autonomy and
condemns sexual aggression, and “popular opinion,” which supposes that
34

Id.
Id. at 1084.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 1085.
38
Id.
39
The Criminal Code of Canada, for example, does not allow the defense of honest but
mistaken belief in consent unless the accused has taken “reasonable steps” to ascertain that the
complainant was consenting. C.C.C. Sec. 273.2
40
Decker & Baroni, supra note 3, at 1167.
41
Id. As Robin West points out, this would constitute fraud in most other contexts. Robin
West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442,
1443 (1993).
42
Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution
of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957 (2008).
35
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sexual autonomy “may be forfeited by female promiscuity or flirtation, and
views male sexual aggression as natural, if not indeed admirable.”43 As he
puts it:
A number of factors are at work. One, probably more prominent than academic
observers may realize, is the tremendous caseload pressure throughout the system. Sex
crimes units struggle just to process the aggravated cases; until they have more
resources than aggravated cases, only the aggravated cases will be charged. Another is
very likely prosecutorial perception of juror prejudice. If prosecutors have a tough time
winning convictions in the aggravated cases, why should they reach for cases in which
44
guilty verdicts are even more unlikely?

Evidence suggests that prosecutorial discretion based on anticipated
juror bias has indeed served to undermine legislative messaging in the
somewhat analogous context of hate crime laws.45 According to one recent
study, prosecutors expressed concern about including hate crime charges
because “it might complicate the issues of the case before a jury” as well as
the fact of “the political landscape of their jurisdiction as a reason not to
include hate crime charges.”46
Of course, even assuming infinite prosecutorial resources, substantive
standards of affirmative consent, and non-biased juries, many, if not most, of
sexual assault cases pose evidentiary problems at the level of the individual
facts.47 Cases of forcible rape, where the primary issue at trial is generally
identity, are among the most frequently overturned as a result of DNA retesting.48 In cases of acquaintance rape, however, the issue is often consent,
which invariably (and necessarily) boils down to a credibility contest
between the defendant and the victim.49
Legislative initiatives such as “rape shield” laws,50 which prohibit use
of a victim’s prior sexual history to prove her likelihood of consent, and
exceptions to the general ban on “propensity” evidence in order to admit a
defendant’s prior sexual misconduct,51 look to improve the prosecution’s
43

Id. at 958. Dripps concludes that the disconnect between popular opinion and law urges
that prosecutors try close cases before judges, even if that constitutionally limits them to
seeking only six-month prison terms.
44
Id. at 975.
45
Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 893–95 (2014).
46
Id. at 893–94.
47
See generally Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1585 (2007).
48
Id. at 1591.
49
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, He Said, She Said, MS. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2017/04/27/he-said-she-said/.
50
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412.
51
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413.
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chances of proving consent in these cases. Yet, in cases that boil down to a
straightforward he-said/she-said conflict where both parties appear credible,
the defendant must get the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard unless we
agree to ignore the Constitution altogether.52
In short: at the adjudicatory level—much like the investigatory level—
sexual assault prosecutions face both substantive and procedural obstacles.
In the next two Sections, I will consider how these legal obstacles
reciprocally impact cultural discourses about sexual assault and consent. The
dialogue creates unfortunate expressive consequences for the criminal justice
system’s messaging about women’s sexual dignity.
C. RAPE CULTURE: SOCIAL NORMS SHAPING LEGAL NORMS

Legal change, of course, does not happen in isolation, but through a
dialectical exchange with culture.53 Changing cultural norms about right and
wrong affect lawmakers and enforcers, and new legal norms can shape
cultural norms in return, though rarely in a perfect, one-for-one exchange.54
Since the 1970’s, feminist scholars have identified the social phenomenon of
“rape culture” as a negative influence on the reporting, prosecution, and
conviction of sexual assailants.55 “Rape culture” is the belief system
52

As I will discuss in Section I.C, infra, the trend in college administrative proceedings
has been to implement a preponderance of the evidence standard on the issue of consent, which
has drawn criticism and litigation. See Conor Friedersdorf, What Should the Standard of Proof
Be in College Rape Cases?, ATLANTIC (June 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/06/campuses-sexual-misconduct/487505/. Some observers urge a lower
standard of proof even in criminal proceedings. Rei, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applying
The Wrong Legal Standard To Establishing Consent in Rape Cases, DAILY KOS (June 19,
2013),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/6/19/1217232/-Beyond-The-Shadow-of-aDoubt-Applying-The-Wrong-Legal-Standard-To-Establishing-Consent-in-Rape-Case. The
Constitutional question is beyond the scope of this article, which takes as a starting point that
the rule of law requires the same standard of proof apply to all defendants, regardless of
offense.
53
An example is the use of municipal “pooper scooper” ordinances to change social norms
about cleaning up after dogs. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643, 1675 (1996).
54
See Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. OF
L. & ECON. 715, 716–18 (2008) (reviewing the literature on the relationship between law and
norms).
55
See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 389
(1975); Buchwald et al., supra note 5, at vii; Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for
Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 217, 229 (1980); Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise
F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN. Q. 133, 136–37 (1994); Patricia
Novotny, Rape Victims in the (Gender) Neutral Zone: The Assimilation of Resistance?, 1
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 743, 745 n.15 (2003); Vicki NcNickle Rose, Rape as a Social Problem:
A Byproduct of the Feminist Movement, 25 SOC. PROBS. 75, 78 (1977) (“From the feminist
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encouraging and legitimizing male sexual aggression against women.56 The
key features of rape culture include dominant-submissive stereotypes of
male-female sex roles, the perpetuation of so-called “rape myths,” and a
“framework that blames sexual assault on the actions of the victim rather than
questioning the behavior of the rapist.”57
Psychologist Diana Payne has identified seven key myths supporting
rape culture: 1) “She asked for it” (in particular by being drunk); 2) “It wasn’t
really rape” (in the absence of physical injury); 3) “He didn’t mean to”
(because he was too aroused to notice she wasn’t consenting); 4) “She wanted
it” (because women have rape fantasies); 5) “She lied” (because she
consented but then changed her mind afterward); 6) “Rape is a trivial event”
(and women exaggerate its emotional effects); and 7) “Rape is a deviant
event” (because rarely are women raped by their own partners).58 These
myths were embodied in the long-lived common law evidentiary rules about
rape that required proof of force, admitted the complainant’s sexual history
as relevant to both consent and credibility, and failed to recognize marital
rape at all.59
While these formal rules have changed over time, through both statute
and case law,60 such myths continue to animate our society and our legal
perspective, rape is a direct result of our culture’s differential sex role socialization and sexual
stratification.”); see generally Meagan Hildebrand & Cynthia J. Najdowski, The Potential
Impact of Rape Culture on Juror Decision Making: Implications for Wrongful Acquittals in
Sexual Assault Trials, 78 ALBANY L. REV. 1059 (2015).
56
Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1060.
57
Id. at 1062.
58
Diana L. Payne et al., Rape Myth Acceptance: Exploration of Its Structure and Its
Measurement Using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, 33 J. RES. PERSONALITY 27, 59
(1999).
59
The proof of force was a long-standing requirement under the common law for reasons
typified by Victorian gynecologist Lawson Tait, who observed, “I am perfectly satisfied that
no man can effect a felonious purpose on a woman in possession of her senses without her
consent” because, after all, “you cannot thread a moving needle.” SUSAN S.M. EDWARDS,
FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE LAW 122–26 (1981). As to the relevance of prior sexual history
to consent, a nineteenth century American court once asked, “will you not more readily infer
assent in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?”
People v. Abbott, 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838). On the relevance to credibility, it was “a matter
of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the
remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that
of a woman.” State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519 (Mo. 1895).
60
While, as described in Section I.B, supra, the shift from force to consent is still in
progress in the U.S., two English cases, Regina v. Camplin, 1 Cox C.C. 220 (1845), and Regina
v. Fletcher, 8 Cox C.C. 131 (1859), began to shift the law toward the consent model far earlier.
In Camplin, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction for having sex with an insensible
thirteen-year-old after he had given her alcohol “in order to excite her.” 1 Cox. CC at 220. In
Fletcher, the victim was a developmentally disabled girl who had not resisted the defendant’s
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system. Studies have shown support for the beliefs that women who do not
wear bras or do wear short skirts are “asking for trouble,” as well as for the
belief that going to a man’s home with him suggests the desire to consent to
sex.61 Furthermore, laypeople, police officers, rape crisis counselors, and
rapists have been found to support fourteen out of thirty-two rape myths, such
as the idea that a woman should feel guilty after being raped and that the
victim should be responsible for physical resistance.62 Indeed, laypeople,
police officers, and counselors were even more likely than rapists themselves
to believe that women help bring about rape through appearance or behavior,
and that they should physically resist their attackers.63 This last data point is
consistent with the DOJ’s findings about the Missoula Police Department
discussed above in Section I.A.
Hildebrand and Najdowski have posited a psychological model through
which the prevalence of such rape myths may affect jury decision-making in
rape trials.64 They point to the evidence that knowledge is structured
according to cognitive schemas and scripts, and hypothesize that “jurors’
scripts for sexual assault are based on the cultural ‘real rape’ narrative” such
that:
when a woman alleging sexual assault behaved in ways that are inconsistent with the
‘real rape’ script (e.g., she was drinking prior to the assault, she did not physically fight
her attacker, she did not report the assault immediately) or men’s behavior is legitimized
by cultural norms (e.g., expectations about what happens when a woman goes home
65
with a man), jurors may be less likely to believe that a sexual assault occurred.

The authors also suggest that this tendency will be exacerbated by
confirmation bias—the process of seeking out information consistent with
advances. In upholding his conviction, the court said:
The question is, what is the proper definition of the crime of rape? Is it carnal
knowledge of a prosecutrix? If it must be against her will, then the crime was not proved
in this case; but if the offence is complete where it was by force and without her consent,
then the offence proved that was charged in the indictment, and the prisoner was
properly convicted . . . . It would be monstrous to say that these poor females are to be
subjected to such violence, without the parties inflicting it being liable to be indicted.
If so, every drunken woman returning from market, and happening to fall down on the
road side, may be ravished at the will of the passers by.
Fletcher, 8 Cox C.C. at 134.
Rape shield laws have, as also discussed in Section I.B, supra, served as a statutory fix for the
rape myths of the “unchaste” woman.
61
Burt, supra note 55, at 223.
62
Hubert S. Field, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists,
Crisis Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 160, 168 (1978).
63
Id. at 170.
64
Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1073.
65
Id.
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pre-conceived scripts and disregarding other inconsistent information.66
They conclude that rape culture, through its effects on the types of schemas
and scripts that jurors rely on in sexual assault trials, and the resulting
confirmation bias and selective evidence processing, affects the ways jurors
assign responsibility to victims and defendants.67
But where does rape culture come from in the first place? Many scholars
agree that it is socially contingent, rather than purely organic.68 Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin famously critiqued pornography for
contributing to the problem by presenting women as “sexual objects
experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest[,] or other sexual assault” and
“dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities.”69 Beyond actual
pornography, theorists often point the finger at media and pop culture—at
music lyrics, television, advertisements, and social media—which
communicate rape myths and objectified portrayals of women.70 For
example, many critics flag the lyrics of the Robin Thicke song “Blurred
Lines” as a particularly clear example of this phenomenon: “I hate these
blurred lines, I know you want it . . . but you’re a good girl, the way you grab
me, must wanna get nasty.”71 Thicke describes as “blurry” the perceived
contrast between a woman’s stated lack of consent and the “secret” desire for
sex despite herself.72 Notably, the song captured the top spot on Billboard’s
2013 Songs of the Summer chart.73
In another recent example, the HBO television show Game of Thrones,
based on the George R.R. Martin epic fantasy series, A Song of Ice and Fire,
has drawn heavy criticism for its portrayal of sexual violence against
women.74 While we, as viewers, are intended to view most of the show’s
66

Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1077–78.
68
See Buchwald et al., supra note 5, at vii.
69
CATHARINE MACKINNON & ANDREA DWORKIN, IN HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY
CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS 428 (1997).
70
Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1066–67 (citing Monique Ward et al.,
Breasts are for Men: Media, Masculinity Ideologies, and Men’s Beliefs About Women’s
Bodies, 55 SEX ROLES 703, 705 (2006); Nicola Henry & Anastasia Powell, The Dark Side of
the Visual World: Towards a Digital Sexual Ethics, in PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE:
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO OVERCOMING A RAPE CULTURE 84, 90–91 (Nicola Henry
& Anastasia Powell eds., 2014).
71
Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1067.
72
Id.
73
Gary Trust, Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines” is the Song of the Summer, BILLBOARD
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5687036/robin-thickes-blurred-linesis-billboards-song-of-the-summer.
74
See Oliver Noble, All the Sex and Nudity in ‘Game of Thrones’ Season 6, HUFFINGTON
POST (last visited Oct. 5 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/all-the-sex-and-nudity67
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sexual perpetrators as evil, and the violence is realistic to the brutal medieval
world the series portrays, one particular scene from the series’ fourth season
attracted critical ire. In it, Jaime Lannister—a corrupt but often sympathetic
character—comforts his sister over the coffin of the child of their incest. Out
of nowhere (and inaccurately to the parallel scene in the book) Jaime
suddenly growls “you’re a hateful woman; why have the Gods made me love
a hateful woman?” and proceeds to rape her over her protests.75
In a press conference on the matter, Dawn Hawkins, executive director
of the National Center on Sexual Exploitation, accused HBO of bringing “the
ambiance of torture pornography into American living rooms through Game
of Thrones’ explicit depictions of rape, incest, prostitution, and sexual
violence” and urged that “[t]his cocktail of pornography and twisted plot
lines must be denounced as socially irresponsible, especially in an age when
American society is struggling to combat the crises of sexual assault and rape
culture.”76 Yet other commentators have noted that Game of Thrones can
actually be read as a feminist text, due to its depictions of precisely the female
perspectives that are often silenced.77 In this view, while the show may
replicate discourses of masculinity that contribute to “rape culture,” it also—
particularly as supplemented by feminist discourse in online fan
communities—provides “a potential space for change through speaking out
about silenced experiences of trauma.”78
Game of Thrones is just one example of how social media has shaped
feminist discourse about rape culture, providing a space for women to
publicly identify examples and discuss them. This function is particularly
important when, as discussed in Part I, one of the obstacles to proper
enforcement is the culturally contested and legally unstable definition of rape
itself. Two recent, high-profile examples are former Stanford swimmer
Brock Turner’s victim’s widely-circulated account of experiencing the
aftermath of sexual assault while unconscious,79 and the commentary on the
in-season-6-of-game-of-thrones_us_5772c998e4b0eb90355c8a05; see generally VALERIE
ESTELLE FRANKEL, WOMEN IN GAME OF THRONES: POWER, CONFORMITY AND RESISTANCE
(2014).
75
Game of Thrones: Breaker of Chains (HBO television broadcast Apr. 20, 2014).
76
Joe Otterson, ‘Game of Thrones’ Accused of Promoting Rape Culture, ‘Torture
Pornography,’ WRAP (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.thewrap.com/game-of-thrones-accused-ofpromoting-rape-culture-torture-pornography/.
77
See FRANKEL, supra note 74, at 2.
78
Debra Ferreday, Game of Thrones, Rape Culture and Feminist Fandom, 30
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUDIES 21, 21 (2015).
79
See Erin Sheley, Victim Impact Statements and Expressive Punishment in the Age of
Social Media, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 157 (2017), for an account of the significance of the
Stanford victim impact statement in the context of expressive punishment.
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light sentences of Steubenville, Ohio high-school football players Ma’lik
Richmond and Tyler Mays for the video-recorded rape of a sixteen-year-old
girl, during which one of the assailants observed that “some people deserve
to be peed on.”80 As to the latter, it has been said that “social media won the
Steubenville case,”81 after crime blogger Alexandria Goddard compiled
screen shots of Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter posts as evidence of the
assault.82
Cultural theorists praise social media as a forum for witnessing
testimony and critique about rape culture and its effects. As Carrie
Rentschler puts it, “[f]eminist responses to rape culture transform notions of
witnessing, moving from conceptions of witnessing as a sensory-based act of
seeing or hearing to the ability to record and distribute audio-visual evidence
of rape culture.”83 Both the Stanford and Steubenville cases make explicit
not only the relationship between culture and violence, but also between
cultural commentary and the construction of legal truth: culture may indeed
help normalize sexual violence against women, but it can also cast light on
reality in a way that may ultimately affect legal decision-making. In
particular, it has been useful in publicly redefining as rape non-consensual
sexual behavior that had previously been tolerated, or at least not spoken
about.
That said, despite the importance of recognizing rape culture’s effect of
diminishing rapists’ accountability, it is dangerous to use the term as a
blanket critique of much of male behavior generally. Rape is a legal term.
To use it effectively to assign the stigma of criminal accountability where it
belongs, “rape” must be susceptible to a precise definition. While the myth
that limits the definition of rape to circumstances of violent, stranger rape has
demonstrably contributed to the under-reporting and under-enforcement

80

Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/sports/high-school-football-rape-caseunfolds-online-and-divides-steubenville-ohio.html.
81
Adam Cohen, Steubenville Rape Guilty Verdict: The Case That Social Media Won,
TIME (Mar. 17, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/03/17/steubenville-rape-guilty-verdict-thecase-that-social-media-won/.
82
Carrie A. Rentschler, Rape Culture and the Feminist Politics of Social Media, 7
GIRLHOOD STUD. 65, 65–66 (2014).
83
Id. at 69. The same power exists in traditional literature. See, e.g., Leone Sandra
Hankey, Women Write Patriarchal Wrongs: Narrative Resistance to the Rape Culture, in
BEYOND PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW AND LITERATURE IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (Jacqueline St.
Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney eds., 1997) (giving, as an example, Joanna Russ’s
science fiction novel The Female Man, which “shows the effectiveness of going outside legal
discourse and using the tools of plainspeak, parody, and ridicule to reveal the irrationality and
viciousness of the way raped women are treated”).
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crises,84 there are also grave risks should the only alternative narrative be
overly broad.
The discourse of rape culture raises particular problems through its
construction of women as victims. Aya Gruber criticizes the theory of rape
culture for perpetuating, to an unhealthy degree, what she terms the “trauma
narrative” of rape in the context of campus sex.85 The trauma narrative is
“rife with other risks, including bureaucratic management of students
stripped of their subjectivity and speech restrictions” and “construes sexual
assault complainants as devastated (or self-deluding) and female students as
incapable of self-management.”86 In short, she fears, “anti-rape culture
repackages feminist energy and female empowerment as sexual
victimhood.”87 She also notes the dangers of widespread silence around the
topic of rape, epitomized by the increasing calls for “trigger warnings” to
avoid potentially traumatizing rape victims.88
Commentators who overuse the notion of “rape culture” run the risk of
constructing the victim as perpetually fragile and unable to escape a
subordinating cultural context. This notion shares disturbing commonalities
with precisely the patriarchal culture it opposes. Indeed, through a
comparative analysis of contemporary American culture with patriarchal
Puritan culture, Bryden and Madore conclude that patriarchal culture—
traditionally cited as a pre-condition to rape culture—was in fact less rape
supportive than contemporary egalitarian culture.89 The authors do not
endorse a return to Puritan culture, nor a shift in enforcement focus away
from attempting to change rapists’ behavior in favor of changing women’s
behavior—they simply note that speculating about patriarchal origins is not
always constructive in shaping rape policy, as it does not appear to be
independently criminogenic.90
No less an authority than the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network
(RAINN) has warned of the consequences of allowing a monolithic critique
of culture to distract from the uniquely condemnable individual culpability
of the comparatively small percentage of men who are actually rapists:
In the last few years, there has been an unfortunate trend towards blaming ‘rape culture’
for the extensive problem of sexual violence on campuses. While it is helpful to point
84

See supra Part I and supporting footnotes.
Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape Culture, 64 KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1048–49 (2016).
86
Id. at 1048.
87
Id. at 1049.
88
Id. at 1049–50.
89
David P. Bryden & Erica Madore, Patriarchy, Sexual Freedom, and Gender Equality
as Causes of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299, 345 (2016).
90
Id.
85
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out the systemic barriers to addressing the problem, it is important to not lose sight of
a simple fact: rape is caused not by cultural factors but by the conscious decisions, of a
small percentage of the community, to commit a violent crime.91

Even in pursuit of the very laudable goal of getting the justice system to
accurately label and punish acquaintance rapists such as Brock Turner and
the Steubenville defendants, it does a disservice to their victims to blur their
criminal conduct into that of every boorish or mildly inappropriate display of
masculinity (such as, for example, the campaign video of Ted Cruz trying to
kiss his very reluctant daughter, which Huffington Post blogger Charles
Clymer described as a “prime example” of “‘benign’ rape culture.”92)
Another potentially problematic feature of the “rape culture” critique is
the extent to which it has focused heavily on college campuses. The
horrifying statistic that one in five female college students has been sexually
assaulted has been widely-circulated in the press, even by President Obama,
who made campus rape a “marquee issue” for his administration.93 That
statistic comes from the 2007 Campus Sexual Assault Study, funded by the
National Institute of Justice, which had a sample size of 5,466 female college
students at two public universities.94 Yet those numbers diverge wildly from
other studies, such as the National Crime Victimization Survey, conducted in
2011 by the federal government with a national sample of females age
eighteen to twenty-four.95 In that study, an estimated 0.8% of non-college
respondents reported that they were victims of threatened, attempted, or
completed sexual assault, in contrast to approximately 0.6% of college
females.96 It is difficult to evaluate these numbers, particularly in light of the
data, discussed in Section I.A suggesting that college students are less likely
to report sexual assault than are their non-college counterparts.
Regardless, Deborah Tuerkheimer argues that the potentially misguided
focus on primarily campus rape has created a “discrepancy between
competing rape definitions,” one of which involves non-forcible sexual
91
Letter from Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) to White House Task
Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.rainn.org/
images/03-2014/WH-Task-Force-RAINN-Recommendations.pdf.
92
Blake Neff, HuffPo Contributor: Cruz’s Awkward Daughter Hug Example of ‘Rape
Culture,’ DAILY CALLER (Feb. 1, 2016), http://dailycaller.com/2016/02/01/huffpocontributor-cruzs-awkward-daughter-hug-example-of-rape-culture/.
93
Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assa
ult_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.html.
94
CHRISTOPHER KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY vii (Oct. 2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf.
95
See generally SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 18.
96
Id. at 1.
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violations by acquaintances in a college setting, and the other of which
perpetuates the myth of the force requirement in most other settings.97 She
argues that this false dichotomy overlooks non-forcible violations against
non-student victims, who are, contrary to current popular assumptions,
actually even more vulnerable to acquaintance or intimate partner rape than
are undergraduates.98
And, of course, there is the risk of actual false reporting. While this is
a risk in all criminal contexts, the old myth that it was much more likely in
sexual assault cases has resulted in an overcorrection whereby commentators
sometimes suggest that even raising the concern is, in and of itself, a part of
rape culture.99 Because the university setting is unique in that it has its own,
sub-legal disciplinary system, students accused of rape can be expelled from
school (and stigmatized forever) with procedural safeguards far below the
standard required by the Due Process Clause in a criminal context.100 This
trend has been motivated in part by pressure from the Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which can strip schools of federal
funding for failure to comply with Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.101 In an open letter in the Boston Globe, twenty-eight Harvard Law
School professors, citing the lack of rights to confrontation and counsel in
Harvard’s new policies, protested that the OCR’s directives “lack the most
basic elements of fairness and due process, are overwhelmingly stacked
against the accused, and are in no way required by Title IX law or
regulation.”102
The question of whether or not OCR’s policies for adjudicating campus
rape cases are sound or even constitutional is far beyond the scope of this
article. That said, the significant public turmoil generated by the debate is,
in and of itself, a problem. The cyclical relationship between law, culture,
and under-reporting is likely only going to be exacerbated by a polarized
public discourse in which the only two perceived options are dismissing the
97

Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2015).
Id.
99
See, e.g., Jenny Kutner, False Reports of Rape are Vanishingly Rare, So Why Treat
Women Like Liars By Default?, SALON (June 1, 2015), http://www.salon.com/
2015/06/01/false_reports_of_rape_are_vanishingly_rare_so_why_treat_women_as_liars_by
_default/.
100
See Yoffe, supra note 93.
101
Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2017).
102
Eugene Volokh, 28 Harvard Law Professors Condemn Harvard’s New Sexual
Harassment Policy and Procedures, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/15/28-harvard-lawprofessors-condemn-harvards-new-sexual-harassment-policy-and-procedures/?utm_term
=.e7a267fd579f.
98
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widespread victimization of women and fully excusing the culture that
supports it or embarking on a non-differentiated war against “rape culture”
that relies on new stereotypes about all of its participants. Not only do such
choices lead to a break-down in positive communication and education, they
contribute further to the substantive confusion over the precise meaning of
sexual assault.
D. EXPRESSIVE PUNISHMENT: LEGAL NORMS SHAPING SOCIAL
NORMS

If cultural norms affect the law, the law likewise affects cultural norms.
The “expressive” function of punishment is the law’s capacity to send a
message of condemnation about a particular criminal act.103 In Jeffrie
Murphy’s formulation, a wrongdoer’s crime sends a message to the world
about the value of his victim: “[t]here are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to
us, ‘I count but you do not,’ ‘I can use you for my purposes,’ or ‘I am here
up high and you are there down below.’”104 Conversely, punishment sends a
reciprocal message, in a kind of dialogue with the crime.105 Punishment
allows the criminal justice system to condemn the criminal’s devaluation of
the victim by devaluing him or her as a result of it.
Anthony Duff explains that this communicative process is both forward
and backward-looking, and that there are multiple audiences for the message
communicated by punishment.106 In his framework, the expressive theory:
Takes the primary communicative purpose of punishment to be the communication to
offenders of the condemnation they deserve for the wrongs they have committed, and
explains that purpose in back-ward looking terms of what we, as a polity, owe to
victims, to offenders, and to ourselves as a political community . . . as a response to
107
such wrongs . . . .

Yet punishment is also forward-looking because it helps the convicted
to “understand, and so to repent [the] wrong as a wrong both against the
individual victim (where there was one) and against the wider political
community to which they both belong.”108 Expressive punishment therefore
103
See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING &
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970); Jean Hampton, An
Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed.,
1992); Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25
(Murphy & Hampton eds., 1988).
104
Murphy, supra note 103, at 25.
105
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 463
(1999).
106
R. A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1182 (2005).
107
Id.
108
Id.
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recognizes the relationships between victim, offender, and society as a whole
that are all implicated by the offense.109 Punishment sends messages to the
offender about his conduct, to the victim about his or her worth in the view
of society at large, and to society about what we, collectively, demand from
one another and refuse to tolerate.110
Furthermore, the expressive function of punishment is both retributive
and utilitarian. As to the former, Jean Hampton argues that what the criminal
justice system must express through punishment is the message of
equivalence between victim and offender that lies at the heart of retributivism
or “just desserts” theory:
The retributive punisher uses the infliction of suffering to symbolize the subjugation of
the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the victim. And the message
carried in this subjugation is ‘What you did to her, she can do to you. So you’re equal.’
The one who acted as if he were the lord of the victim is humbled to show that he isn’t
lord after all. In this way, the demeaning message implicit in his action is denied.
111
Therefore, just as the crime has symbolic meaning, so too does the punishment.

While retributivism does not fundamentally require an expressive
component—an offender can be punished according to just desserts for the
sake of the punishment itself—as I have argued previously, Hampton’s
theory gets to the heart of the symbolic effects of a crime.112 “Implicit in
expressive retributivism is the concept that, even if a punishment can be
proportional to the physical harm done to a victim, the symbolic harm can
only be remedied if this proportionality is communicated to all parties
involved, including the public.”113
More importantly for our current purposes, expressive punishment
likewise serves a utilitarian function. The law has the power to change social
norms and behavior via the messages it expresses, through what has been
called a “persuasive” and “acculturating” effect.114 Thus, even if we set aside
concerns about proportionality of punishment as an end in and of itself,
simply communicating condemnation of certain behavior—particularly if it
does so in a way that is seen as procedurally fair—may lead to a practical

109

Id.
Id. at 1182–86.
111
Hampton, supra note 103, at 5.
112
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reduction in crime.115 Furthermore, punishing an offender appears to have
the additional utilitarian benefit of increasing a victim’s social standing in his
or her community.116
The communicative function of punishment flows not only from the
actual sentence imposed in a particular case, but also from the full gamut of
institutional expressions at each stage of the criminal process. The existence
and content of a criminal law in the first place expresses that conduct beyond
certain parameters is unacceptable and warrants official sanction; this
message-sending function is frequently noted in the legislative debates over
proposed statutes.117 As Avlana Eisenberg notes in her study on the
expressive effects of hate crime prosecutions, enforcement decisions can also
be expressive.118 With only so much bandwidth, prosecutors necessarily
wield a broad degree of discretion in deciding what cases to bring.119 As
Eisenberg puts it, “much of a law’s communicative impact is not felt until
later and is bound up with whether and how the legislation is enforced.”120
With these goals in mind, it is clear to see how the underreporting and
under-enforcement of sexual assault laws—certainly when attributable to the
endurance of rape myths within the system, but even when caused by
inescapable evidentiary and resource issues—has led to an expressive crisis
surrounding the criminalization of sexual assault. The law’s failure to
penalize many forms of sexist violence has created a kind of cultural
permission for these acts.121 As a result, the systemic difficulties we have
encountered in defining a sexual assault and the requirements for proving
lack of consent have resulted in a significant public discourse among sexual
assault survivors who feel as though the system cannot or will not recognize
the wrongs they have suffered.
The Twitter hashtag #WhyWomenDontReport has collected thousands
of tweets by women identifying as sexual assault survivors providing
explanations for why they did not seek recourse through the criminal justice
system.122 While the spectrum of reasons given by these women runs the
115
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gamut from fear of professional fallout to cultural resistance to generalized
fear of not being believed by communities, friends, and family, many women
point to the criminal justice system itself as being unwelcoming or unwilling
to provide redress or even threatening to the victims in and of itself.123
A survey of tweets falling into the latter category provides a number of
examples:
“Because no matter when you tell your story, they’ll try to discredit you with “Why
124
now?”
“From the moment a woman walks into a police station/hospital the system is working
125
against her.”
“I watched enough SVU to know no one would believe me. I was 15 & scared. I knew
126
the cops were ppl who would hurt Muslims like me.”

A quick scan of the contributions to the hashtag in December 2016
provides some others:
“Also why on earth would women ever report at this point? Because the justice system
127
has been so kind to survivors?”
“Because they’ll [sic] be mountains of evidence of rape and this chump will put it down
128
to ‘young girls lying for attention.’”
“Despite marital rape being illegal, no one believes it’s possible since your relationship
129
must be a sign of consent.”
130

“So our new AG appears to not know what constitutes sexual assault.”

The expressive breakdown around the criminalization of sexual assault
roared into the public sphere in the Brock Turner case, after he was convicted
of manually sexually assaulting an unconscious woman and subsequently
123
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sentenced to only six months in county jail.131 California Superior Court
Judge Aaron Persky prompted outrage with his observation, during
sentencing, that “a prison sentence would have a severe impact on him. I
think he will not be a danger to others.”132 The impact statement given by
the Stanford victim created a social media firestorm after it was released by
the court and appeared on the website BuzzFeed.133 The statement had
immediate public resonance in part due to the victim’s eloquent account of
the harm she had suffered after the non-consensual encounter, as well as her
re-victimization by the justice system itself.134
E. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is impossible to make confident assertions of causation in a context as
complex as the tangle of social and legal circumstances affecting sexual
assault enforcement. That said, the preceding analysis reveals a significant,
mutually reinforcing relationship between appearance and reality
complicating the legal system’s ability to address rape. Longstanding
assumptions about the nature of rape have thwarted enforcement of new legal
definitions, perhaps due in part to prosecutorial knowledge of likely juror
behavior (in addition, of course, to legitimate evidentiary problems). In turn,
under-enforcement appears to have contributed to both underreporting, and a
widely shared belief among victims and some women that the criminal
system does not provide justice. To the extent that the system expresses this
message through under-enforcement, it contributes to the original cultural
assumptions that only certain forms of non-consensual sex qualify as “real
rape.” Which brings us back to the beginning, in a perfectly vicious cycle.
Courts, prosecutors, and lawmakers must find a way to interrupt this cycle
by changing the expressive messages about rape the criminal justice system
currently produces.
II. BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY
This Part will explore what we know about using the criminal law to
131
Victor Xu, Brock Turner Sentenced to Six Months in County Jail, Three Years
Probation, STAN. DAILY (June 2, 2016), http://www.stanforddaily.com/2016/06/02/
brock-turner-sentenced-to-six-months-in-county-jail-three-years-probation/.
132
Katie J.M. Baker, Here is the Powerful Letter the Stanford Victim Read Aloud to Her
Attacker, BUZZFEED (June 3, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/katiejmbaker/heres-thepowerful-letter-the-stanford-victim-read-to-her-ra?utm_term=.gp44bWgMB#.blMBP54L9.
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Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage,
N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanfordrape-case-over-dueling-statements-of-victim-and-attackers-father.html.
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See generally Sheley, supra note 79 (analyzing the expressive effects of the Stanford
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manage appearances in the hopes of changing reality. I take up the most
famous example of this effort, the Broken Windows theory of policing, to
consider its strengths, weaknesses, and potential application to the
prosecution of sexual assault.
A. THE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS

In a famous 1982 article for the Atlantic Monthly, criminologists James
Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling proposed that policing minor offenses, such
as loitering, panhandling, prostitution, and graffiti, might reduce more
serious crime.135 Their idea turned on the relationship between the
appearance of disorder and the actual amount of disorderly behavior in
society: “If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all of the
windows will soon be broken.”136 As its name suggests, “Broken Windows”
theory has a strong aesthetic component, and has been associated with the
elimination of offenses—such as the particular form of pan-handling engaged
in by New York City’s “squeegee men”—most likely to be visually irritating
to a city-dweller going about his or her daily life.137
This theory eventually became the basis for new policing strategies in
several major U.S. cities in the 1990s, most notably Rudolph Giuliani’s New
York.138 The New York Police Department (NYPD) increased arrests for
minor yet visible misdemeanor and ordinance violations; the years 1994 and
1998 saw an increase in misdemeanor arrests by about 40,000 per year.139
Other cities, such as Chicago and Los Angeles, followed suit and adopted a
Broken Windows approach to policing, otherwise known as “order
maintenance” policing.140 The years 1991 to 2001 also saw a dramatic,
nation-wide drop in crime—homicide by 43%, violent crime by 34%, and
property crime by 29% according to some measures.141 While more
measurable factors such as the overall increase in the number of police, the
rise of the prison population, the decline of the crack epidemic, and the
135
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legalization of abortion can help explain this drop,142 supporters of order
maintenance theory declared victory.143
The exact mechanism by which Broken Windows theory operates has
always been somewhat hazy. As Adam Samaha notes, the theory is not a
monolithic idea of causation but, rather, a collection of various potential
relationships between appearance and disorder.144 He notes, for example,
that “one might hypothesize that the appearance of a broken window will
soon lead to an outbreak of window breaking and nothing else, or that much
more serious misconduct will soon follow,” but that, regardless, “a theme in
broken windows theory of misconduct is that the appearance of disorder
suggests to observers that disorder is uncontrolled and that this perception
prompts some people toward even greater disorder that is, in fact, not
controlled.”145
Despite the staggering drop in crime—which was even greater in New
York City, where Broken Windows policing was most widely adopted—
criminologists hotly contest its efficacy. No scholarly consensus currently
exists on the theory, and there is, at best, weak empirical evidence to support
its broadest form.146 In a 2015 meta-analysis of thirty randomized tests of
disorder policing, Anthony Braga and his co-authors discovered a statistically
significant, modest crime reduction effect, across a range of violent, property,
and drug-based offenses.147 Specifically, they found that the strongest effects
are generated by community and problem-solving interventions designed to
change social and physical disorder conditions at particular places.148
Conversely, aggressive order maintenance strategies that target individual
disorderly behaviors do not generate significant crime reductions.149 The
various studies undergirding these conclusions merit summary.
In a 1990 study of thirty neighborhoods, Wesley Skogan found a
statistically significant relationship between citizens’ perceptions of disorder
and the rate of robbery, even after controlling for race, poverty, and proxies

142
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for neighborhood stability.150 However, Bernard Harcourt, examining the
same data, concluded that Skogan’s study should be qualified due to the facts
that it omitted certain data on robbery and disorder, and that the victims
surveyed had not been asked about the location of the relevant crimes.151
Further, he concluded there was no statistically significant relationship
between perceptions of disorder and other crimes beyond robbery, such as
rape, burglary, assault, or purse snatching.152
In a 2001 Manhattan Institute study of New York City neighborhoods
in the 1990s, George Kelling and William Sousa found a large, statistically
significant inverse relationship between misdemeanor arrests and violent
crime (defined as homicide, rape, robbery, and felony assault).153 By
contrast, they could not find a significant positive relationship between the
violent crime rate and other proxy variables, such as cocaine use, young male
population, and low socioeconomic conditions.154 Kelling and Sousa
concluded that a neighborhood could expect to suffer one less violent crime
for approximately every twenty-eight misdemeanor arrests and that Broken
Windows policing had thus prevented over 60,000 violent crimes in the
1990s.155
By contrast, Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig used data similar to
Kelling and Sousa, but controlled for the violent crime rate in each
neighborhood leading up to 1989 and shifted from the average arrest rate for
the decade to the yearly arrest rate from the years 1989 to 1998.156 Harcourt
and Ludwig concluded that the pattern of crime reduction Kelling and Sousa
attributed to “Broken Windows” policing was equally consistent with “mean
reversion”—that those precincts receiving the most Broken Windows
policing were the ones that experienced the largest increases and levels of
crime during New York’s crack epidemic.157 In other words, precincts that
had the most severe increases in crime also had the sharpest decreases, as
they readjusted to the state of affairs prior to the epidemic.158 The authors
further found, based on data from a five-city social experiment called
“Moving to Opportunity,” that participants’ movements to less disorderly,
150
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less disadvantaged communities did not appear to reduce criminal behavior,
and that therefore if disorder does affect crime, such effects are: “Small
enough to be dominated by whatever pernicious effects on people’s criminal
behavior may arise from increases in neighborhood socioeconomic status, as
would be expected to occur to some degree in normal circumstances as
neighborhoods with declines in disorder begin to gentrify.”159
Despite the fact that the sweeping claims about the success of Broken
Windows—particularly in the political rhetoric of the Giuliani
administration160—do not appear to be borne out by the data, other research
does reveal an impact around the margins, particularly in certain contexts.
Richard Rosenfeld et al., controlling for mean reversion, examined precinctlevel data on robbery and homicide rates in the years 1984 and 1988.161 They
found that these offenses were statistically significantly associated with
misdemeanor and ordinance-violation arrests from 1988 to 2001, though they
also concluded that these arrests explained only 7–12% of the decline in
homicides and 1–5% of the decline in robberies.162 Other work suggests that
Broken Windows policing has an impact only on certain crimes, such as
homicide with guns, and little effect on others, such as homicide without guns
(presumably because misdemeanor arrests allow the police the opportunity
to get guns off of the street incident to arrest, which does not itself relate to
the hypothesis that perceptions of disorder affect violent crime).163 While
these impacts are small, as Samaha points out, “it depends on what counts as
small when lives are at stake and when people have only so many policy
levers to pull.”164
A couple of other studies have found some smaller, context-specific
Broken Windows impacts. In 2010, Magdalena Certa and her colleagues
broke down New York City gun homicides into three groups by victim age,
and concluded that higher misdemeanor arrest rates did have a statistically
significant negative association with the rate of gun homicide on adult
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victims thirty-five-years and older between 1990 and 1999.165 Broken
Windows theory looks more promising when examined not as a blunt tool
positing overall violent crime reduction from a zero-tolerance misdemeanor
arrest policy, but with attention to specific policing strategies. In 2008,
Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond studied thirty-four high-crime areas in
Lowell, Massachusetts, and divided them into pairs, where one of each pair
received a number of law-enforcement interventions.166 Such interventions
included: “order maintenance” strategies, such as increases in misdemeanor
arrests and stops-and-frisks; “situational strategies” to target disorder, such
as more street lighting, video surveillance, and destruction of vacant
buildings; and “social service” strategies that connected law enforcement
with mental health providers, homeless shelters, and youth recreation
services.167 After one year, the experimental neighborhoods had around 20%
fewer emergency calls than the control neighborhoods.168 Among the three
methods of intervention, situational strategies were most strongly associated
with fewer calls; misdemeanor arrests were less effective but still statistically
significant, and social service strategies failed to produce a significant
effect.169
In their meta-analysis of all of this literature, Braga and Bond concluded
that order maintenance policing is an effective use of law enforcement
resources, but that it is most effective when it involves a cooperative effort
between law enforcement and other stakeholders: “[I]ncivility reduction is
rooted in a tradition of stable relationships with the community and
responsiveness to local concerns . . . a sole commitment to increasing
misdemeanor arrests . . . may undermine relationships in low-income, urban
minority communities where coproduction is most needed and distrust
between the police and citizens is most profound.”170
The work of Braga and Bond constitutes the first large-scale metaanalysis of the data on Broken Windows policing, and suggests that there is
indeed at least some value to focusing on reducing low-level disorder, and
the appearance thereof, as a means of targeting higher level violent crime.171
Yet, their attention to the potential risk of undermining the relationship
165
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between law enforcement and citizens in low income and minority
communities highlights another common criticism of Broken Windows.
Scholars criticize Broken Windows for its alienation of minority
communities from the police that should be protecting them: “NYPD arrest
policies . . . have helped shape a managerial, non-adjudicative, ordermaintenance system of criminal justice that reflects the growing racial and
socioeconomic divide between New York City’s haves and have-nots.”172
While Broken Windows as a theory is race-neutral, there is significant
evidence that it has been deployed by law enforcement in a racialized manner,
resulting in exactly the mutual hostility between law enforcement and
citizens warned of by the Braga study.173 The widespread use of “stop-andfrisk” given Fourth Amendment sanction by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio has become emblematic of this ongoing problem, particularly on the
occasions it spirals into police violence against unarmed citizens.174 Thus,
any argument based in part upon the idea of order maintenance must take into
account the terrible costs of its racialized misapplication.
B. THE VARIOUS FUNCTIONS OF REGULATING FOR APPEARANCE

I mentioned previously that the Broken Windows theory may suggest
more than one understanding of the relationship between perceived disorder
and criminal harm, depending on the nature of the particular harm sought to
be prevented.175 To consider the theory’s potential application to the specific
context of sexual assault, we must be precise about the relationship with
which we presume to work. Adam Samaha has proposed a framework for
understanding the major categories of potential connection between
appearance and reality in the context of government policy-making, which
provides a useful analytical aid for this process.176
Samaha identifies three relevant relationships: 1) reality insulated from
172
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appearance, 2) appearance driving reality, and 3) reality collapsing into
appearance from the outset.177 As an example of reality insulated from
appearance, he points to a bridge, the actual safety of which may diverge,
even radically, from its appearance.178 While it would be undesirable to have
a structurally safe bridge that looked run-down, thus deterring people from
using it, it would be even worse if it looked safe and was not deterring people
from using it. In contrast, to illustrate the case of appearance driving reality
Samaha gives the example of a bank.179 Samaha notes that banks go out of
their way to project an appearance of respectability and solidity through such
means as steel and granite architectural choices.180 The trick “is to generate
the belief among a sufficient number of potential and actual depositors that
the banks will not be destabilized by depositors making a run.”181 In that
manner, appearance becomes reality because confident depositors leave their
money in the institution: “Widespread depositor confidence in a bank can
make the institution justifiably stable, whether or not the expectation against
a future bank run can be counted as a false belief.”182
In applying these first two categories to the current state of knowledge
on Broken Windows theory, Samaha cautions that its proponents may put too
much weight on the assumption that it functions according to a bank model,
where enforcing the appearance of order secures actual order. If this is not
true—if crime control functions, instead, according to a bridge model— then
Broken Windows policing may pose “transparency problems.”183
Transparency problems arise in bridge models where the general public is
misled about the reality of a policy situation by focusing instead on
appearances.184 In the case of Broken Windows this would mean that the
public was overly persuaded that the new policing strategy drove down
violent crime.185
Samaha notes that the gap between appearance and reality in this context
may be narrower and therefore less harmful than in other contexts, such as
political corruption: “The broken windows transparency issue involves overclaiming about the causal effect of a policing strategy, rather than misleading
the public about violent crime or misdemeanor arrest rates.”186 By contrast,
177
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he points out, judicial enforcement of campaign finance regulation has
become so focused on the “appearance of corruption” that courts have
stopped asking whether fixing appearances will do anything to prevent actual
corruption.187 In any case, the current data suggests that Broken Windows
policing may engage both the bridge and bank model: the efficacy of focusing
on appearance to fix reality has likely been overstated by political actors in
this context, but there remains evidence that, at least in certain circumstances,
a bank model applies.188
That said, Samaha’s third category—cases where reality collapses into
appearance from the outset—provides another useful framework for
understanding Broken Windows.189 To illustrate this model, he uses the
example of the clock constructed in a town square to serve as the official time
for a municipality.190 As he puts it, “[i]n the case of standard time used for
coordination purposes, the reality in question is constructed from beliefs that
follow salient representations of time.”191 In other words, there is no “deeper
truth” to the fact that it is 12:00 PM—it just matters that everyone agrees
12:00 PM is the same thing.192 The clock is an aesthetic mechanism for
coordinating the minds of all of the citizens to create the relevant reality: that
it’s 12:00 PM whenever the clock says it is.193
Samaha contends that arguments surrounding policy decisions in which
appearance and reality collapse rely on “logic and values special to aesthetics
and expressivism.”194 This is because even where appearance and reality
collapse, there is debate as to the content of what should result; the examples
he gives on that point are the fact that constitutional challenges to
government-sponsored Confederate flags are rarely judicially entertained
despite the fact that challenges to government-sponsored religious symbols
are.195 These debates center on taste-like evaluations, similar to arguments
over textual interpretation.196 While Samaha characterizes these sorts of
decisions as largely aesthetic,197 he may overly minimize them. Defining a
criminal offense is, on the one hand, a purely expressive problem: we must
agree collectively on what legally constitutes rape, in much the same way
187
188
189
190
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that we agree upon what constitutes 12:00 PM. Both are somewhat artificial
constructions, but the former clearly has both moral and utilitarian
significance.
As to the justifications for Broken Windows theory, Samaha proposes
that the bridge/bank problem he identified could be mitigated if policymakers focused more on the “clock” model.198 The transparency problems
would disappear if there were no gap between appearance and reality: in other
words, if the orderly appearance attained through misdemeanor enforcement
were the end in and of itself.199 As he puts it: “Most people seem to find
graffiti ugly, loitering discomforting, and public urination obnoxious. If it
effectively targets these problems, [B]roken [W]indows policing could be
worth the cost without any benefit other than aesthetic comfort for
mainstream residents.”200
This argument is, of course, open to the criticism that, if all we’re really
getting from Broken Windows is better aesthetics, it is not worth the welldocumented costs in terms of racialized enforcement—at least unless
enforcement practices change dramatically.
Nonetheless, Samaha’s
categories give us a much broader canvas to paint on as we consider the
function of broken windows theory in any particular context.
C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR A BROKEN WINDOWS APPROACH TO
SEXUAL ASSAULT

The prior sections have explained how the under-enforcement of sexual
assault laws create expressive problems that tend to devalue the experiences
of rape victims; the centrality of defining consent to these problems; and the
mechanisms by which Broken Windows policing may affect the relationship
between appearance and reality.201 I now suggest a framework for thinking
about sexual assault enforcement and Broken Windows. Existing research
suggests that Broken Windows policing may productively manage the
relationship between appearance and reality in the area of crime control in
one of two ways: 1) through a bank model, which is controversial but is
supported by at least some evidence, or 2) through a clock model, insofar as
it attacks detrimental appearances for their own sake.202 Further, with regard
to the clock model, we can also say that appearances can be changed for their
own sake to create new expressive legal values, which may themselves be
contested (the Confederate flag and the religious icons, for example—or the
198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 1632.
Id.
Id.
See supra Parts I–II.B and supporting footnotes.
See Samaha, supra note 144.
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meaning of a legal term such as sexual assault).203
With respect to sexual assault, the question we should ask of a bank
model is whether we can use the law to alter the appearances of the world as
a sexually dangerous place for women—widely described as rape culture—
in such a way that it would have a positive effect on reality. We should ask
of a clock model whether there are contestable appearances of sexual danger
that create their own reality. In other words, are there choices in policy or
enforcement we could make that would directly alter the aesthetic fact of rape
culture itself, with positive results, even if they did not lead to a reduction in
the reality of actual sexual assault? I will refer to this as the narrow clock
model. But I propose that we can ask a third question here as well. Are there
openly debated expressive values—particularly related to the currently
volatile legal understanding of consent—that we can alter through attention
to appearances? I will refer to this as the broad clock model.
The data on Broken Windows theory generally does not give us concrete
answers to the bridge model question, though Braga and Bond’s 2015 study
suggests that the best place to start would be through a model of community
engagement, focused on specific geographic places.204 Thus, we would want
to think more about the role of space and community as a context for sexual
assault. As to both the narrow and broad forms of the clock model, we should
look to the sexualized aspects of disorder qua disorder. Wesley Skogan, who
has studied disorder itself as part of the “downward spiral of urban decay”
describes its social dimensions with attention to this component:
Disorder is evident in the widespread appearance of junk and trash in vacant lots; it is
evident, too, in decaying homes, boarded-up buildings, the vandalism of public and
private property, graffiti, and stripped and abandoned cars in streets and alleys. It is
signaled by bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, by the presence of
prostitutes and panhandlers, by public drinking, the verbal harassment of women, and
205
open gambling and drug use.

Skogan’s account recognizes sexual violence—in the form of genderbased street harassment— as a component of general disorder, the component
that drives the appearance of sexual danger for women. This recognition
suggests that we should look to street harassment if we are going to apply
Broken Windows theory to the appearance of sexual violence.206 Yet
203

Id. at 1581.
See Braga & Bond, supra note 166, at 1628–29 and supporting notes.
205
SKOGAN, supra note 150, at 2 (emphasis added).
206
See David P. Bryden & Erica Madore, Patriarchy, Sexual Freedom, and Gender
Equality as Causes of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299, 306 (2016) (suggesting, “by a
rough analogy to the ‘broken windows’ theory of crime prevention, disrespectful treatment
of women, ranging from sexist jokes to street harassment, may help to create an environment
that encourages more serious offenses such as rape”).
204
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Skogan’s account likewise groups street harassment with a list of aesthetic,
property, and vice crimes and ailments, most of which lack specific human
victims. This failure in and of itself belies the fact that harassment has been
insufficiently recognized as an offense of violence against the person, rather
than merely an unattractive symptom of urban disorder. To better understand
how Broken Windows can help us with the precise expressive harms of
sexual “disorder,” we need to consider street harassment as a unique problem.
III. STREET HARASSMENT
As mentioned, Broken Windows enforcement has focused heavily on
the visual. The theory relies upon the public perceiving a world that was
cleaner, safer, and more orderly. While street harassment differs from
vandalism in that it has an immediate, human victim, it is highly visible. It
thus differs dramatically from sexual assault, which most often takes place
behind closed doors with few witnesses other than the assailant and the
victim. Yet street harassment carries with it the threat of sexual violence of
which rape is the ultimate manifestation. In that way, the two offenses are
linked far more closely than vandalism or pan-handling and assault or
murder. For that reason we can profitably explore how regulating the
appearance of sexual assault may impact its reality.
A. WHAT IS STREET HARASSMENT?

Street harassment has been notoriously hard to define, and it
encompasses a wide range of behavior. According to one account, we can
observe a three-level hierarchy of street harassment, with the most severe
incarnations including 1) “sexually explicit references to a woman’s body or
[] sexual [acts]”; 2) gender-based profanity; 3) qualifying comments
accompanied by slurs about race or sexual orientation; and 4 ) physical acts
such as groping.207 Moderately severe harassment includes sexual innuendos
or “references to a woman’s gender or body that are not sexually explicit.”208
The least severe category includes staring, whistling, or comments made to a
woman that are “unnecessary or not political in nature.”209
Street harassment is very pervasive. According to a 2014 study, 65% of
women and 25% of men experienced street harassment over the course of
their lifetime.210 For 41% of women and 16% of men, that harassment
207
Tiffanie Heben, A Radical Reshaping of the Law: Interpreting and Remedying Street
Harassment, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 183, 187–88 (1994).
208
Id.
209
Id. at 188.
210
HOLLY KEARL, STOP STREET HARASSMENT, UNSAFE AND HARASSED IN PUBLIC
SPACES: A NATIONAL STREET HARASSMENT REPORT 14 (2014).
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became physically aggressive.211 In addition, minority respondents were
disproportionately likely to experience such harassment.212
In response to a non-scientific query posted to the author’s Facebook
page, women revealed a consciousness of how their changing appearances
and life choices affected the incidence of harassment. One woman reported
that she used to be catcalled about twenty to thirty times a year before she
started dying her hair vivid, unusual colors. She speculated that there might
be
a silencing of certain types of men, to whom I used to read as a meek and well-mannered
middle-class white lady, and therefore a low-risk target. I now seem slightly more
likely to freak the fuck out on them/be a crazy bitch of one sort or another, so they opt
213
not to catcall.

Another woman, who estimated she was harassed about seventy-five to
eighty times in 2016, reports:
At least two times they involved actual touching of my body, usually in the form of
touching my arm. In one instance a man on a train tried to move my hand toward his
crotch, while saying ‘you are pretty’ and ‘I know what you are,’ [referring, ostensibly,
to her identity as a trans woman] as the other hand remained in his pocket fingering
214
either his penis or a weapon.

A third observed that moving from a “walking” city to a “driving” city
had resulted in a noticeable release from old anxieties about harassment:
I love being wrapped in the protective encasement of my car, safe(r)
from street harassment than I was in the public transport oriented cities I’ve lived in
previously. Sure, I love the idea of walking more, but in practice that means more
exposure to harassment and more active fear of things much worse than
215
‘mere’ harassment. Now I get in the car, I lock the doors, I breathe easier.

A fourth said that “harassment dropped dramatically for me after I
chopped off my hair—people don’t seem to see short hair and think ‘woman,’
even when I’m wearing distinctly ‘female’ clothes (I don’t see that as a
drawback).”216 And a fifth said “[A]s a fat woman, the harassment I have
experienced . . . hasn’t been catcalling but more of the sort like “watch out,
fatty” (even if I wasn’t near bumping into them or they were invading MY
space) version. I’m only now beginning to realize that is harassment just like
catcalling.”217

211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id.
Id.
Confidential email to author (Jan. 3, 2017) (on file with author).
Confidential email to author (Jan. 10, 2017) (on file with author).
Confidential email to author (Jan. 2, 2017) (on file with author).
Confidential Facebook post (Jan. 2, 2017) (on file with author).
Confidential Facebook post (Jan. 2, 2017) (on file with author).
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These accounts vividly demonstrate how street harassment shapes,
overtly and implicitly, a woman’s awareness of her own physical
embodiment. While none of the respondents changed their appearances or
residence to avoid street harassment, their accounts share a latent awareness
of how anonymous harassers’ definition of what constitutes desirable—and
thus available—femininity can impact a woman’s interaction with the world
on a day-to-day basis.
B. DEFINING THE HARM

Over the last twenty or so years, feminist scholars have worked to define
the precise nature of the harm imposed by street harassment as part of the
argument that it ought to be legally cognizable. A common theme in this
literature is the extent to which street harassment entrenches a lowered
standard of basic privacy for women in public spaces, in violation of
otherwise established cultural norms about “civil inattention” (essentially,
the idea that staring at strangers is rude).218 As Cynthia Grant Bowman
observes, “[u]nlike men, women passing through public areas are subject to
‘markers of passage’ that imply either that women are acting out of role
simply by their presence in public or that a part of their role is in fact to be
open to the public.”219 Bowman argues that because breaches of the norm of
civil inattention tend to occur when there is something unusual or out-ofplace about the person observed, the practice of singling out women in public
spaces for commentary shows that “women, unlike men, belong in the private
sphere, the sphere of domestic rather than public responsibility.”220 She notes
that, ironically, “men convey this message by intruding upon a woman’s
privacy as she enters the public sphere.” 221
Conceived of in these terms, street harassment imposes a significant
harm separate from whatever specific embarrassment or discomfort a woman
might experience on a given occasion. To the extent it is tolerated, such
behavior contributes to a shared cultural norm against women accessing
public spaces—a norm with obvious disadvantages for the professional,
recreational, and commercial lives of half the population. Every time a
woman decides against a career with a substantial public, outdoor component
(landscaping, for example), or decides not to walk to the store to spend money
218
See ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 86 (1963) (“The act of staring is
a thing which one does not ordinarily do to another human being; it seems to put the object
stared at in a class apart. One does not talk to a monkey in a zoo, or to a freak in a
sideshow—one only stares.”).
219
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 526 (1993).
220
Id.
221
Id.
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at a certain time of night, this norm affects more than simply the woman’s
dignity on the particular occasion.
The literature also identifies the psychological harms arising from street
harassment. First, it contributes to hostility between the sexes, making it
more difficult for even well-intentioned men to communicate with women
innocuously.222 Second, and perhaps most obviously, it has an enormously
disruptive effect on women’s identities and self-image: as Bowman puts it,
“[w]omen learn to associate their bodies with fear, shame[,] and humiliation.
Women also learn their place in society from language, and they learn that
this place is not a public one.”223 Beth Livingston identifies emotions ranging
from fear, anxiety, anger, shame, and helplessness among the victims of
street harassment and notes that “[t]hese sorts of emotions—particularly
when experienced day after day—can become paralyzing . . . . It is incredibly
likely that, as with many other negative emotional experiences, the impact
can accumulate over time, leading to behavioral and health outcomes that we
should be concerned about.”224 Harassment has also been associated with the
phenomenon of “self-objectification,” a psychological process by which a
subject begins to think of her body as an object for the pleasure of others.225
Self-objectification “can [] teach individuals to ‘associate their bodies with
fear and humiliation . . . [which] may also interfere with [their] ability to be
comfortable with [their] sexuality.’”226 Beyond that, it is correlated with
other negative emotional states such as depression, anxiety, and eating
disorders.227
Feminist scholars have used the term “spirit murder,” originally devised
by Patricia Williams in the context of race, to describe the deep harm street
harassers inflict on their victims.228 The idea is that private behavior that
overtly imposes racist or sexist thought on a victim creates and perpetuates
222

Id. at 540–41 (citing GOFFMAN, supra note 218, at 142).
Bowman, supra note 219, at 540–41.
224
KEARL, supra note 210, at 10 (quoting an interview with Beth Livingston, Assistant
Professor, Cornell University (Apr. 2014)).
225
See Amanda Roenius, Comment, My Name is Not “Beautiful,” and, No, I Do Not
Want to Smile: Paving the Path for Street Harassment Legislation in Illinois, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. 831, 849 (2016) (citing Kathryn Stamoulis, “Hey Baby” Hurts, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug.
19, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-new-teen-age/201108/hey-babyhurts).
226
Id. (quoting Bowman, supra note 219, at 538).
227
Id.
228
See Deirdre Davis, The Harm that Has No Name: Street Harassment, Embodiment,
and African American Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 177 (1994) (asserting that “by
disregarding my right to use my energy as I deem appropriate, the harasser has caused me to
suffer a spirit murder”); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse
of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 151–52
(1987).
223
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subordinating social structures, and gives hatred and fear an outlet.229
Deirdre Davis proposes that this complex tangle of adverse social and
psychological effects flowing from street harassment can be classified into
four categories: exclusion, domination, invasion, and oppression, which all
contribute to “genderizing” the street.230 It excludes by “mark[ing] the street
as male.”231
It dominates by “establishing the rules of women’s
participation” in a street environment.232 It invades by removing women’s
sense of privacy.233 And it oppresses by forcing women to alter their behavior
to avoid it.234
While the forgoing summarized the most direct harms street harassment
imposes on a victim, scholars have theorized that it must also be understood
within a broader context of gender subordination and potential sexual
violence. As Deborah Tuerkheimer puts it:
Because we can never transcend social context, an interaction between one man and
one woman on the street implicates gender and hierarchy in complicated ways that may
go unrecognized by either party. When women refer to the power that a harasser wields,
we allude to the power that he has by virtue of his maleness. On the street, a successful
female executive can be made to feel powerless by a teenage boy who, by his words
alone, “expresses male control over sexual access” to her.235

Thus, street harassment is problematic both in and of itself and as a
reminder of the pervasive threat of literal sexual violation women face.
While street harassment is far more pervasive than the threat of physical
sexual assault, the latter is common enough that women experience the
connection between rape and street harassment on a subjective level.236
Because of its oppressive and sexualized nature, street harassment “reminds
women of their vulnerability to violent attack in American urban centers and
to sexual violence in general.”237
The most extreme view holds that street harassment forms a part of
229

Williams, supra note 228, at 151–52.
Davis, supra note 228, at 136.
231
Id. at 146.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Street Harassment as Sexual Subordination: The
Phenomenology of Gender-Specific Harm, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 167, 182 (1997) (citing
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 85, 92
(1987).
236
Davis, supra note 228, at 141; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149
(2000).
237
Elizabeth Arveda Kissling & Cheris Kramarae, Stranger Compliments: The
Interpretation of Street Remarks, 14 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 75, 76 (1991).
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“sexual terrorism”—“men’s systematic control and domination of women
through actual and implied violence.”238 In a worst-case scenario, potential
rapists can use street harassment to figure out how vulnerable a target may
be to intimidation.239 But even the perception that this could be the case can
cause a range of psychological and physiological responses in a victim. This
is particularly true for a victim who is already the survivor of sexual assault,
for whom street harassment might be particularly frightening or traumatic.240
One 2014 study found that nearly two-thirds of female respondents reported
being at least somewhat concerned that the harassment would escalate into
something far worse.241
C. PROSECUTING HARASSMENT

Perhaps due to the complex and heavily gender-specific nature of street
harassment, the measures to combat it taken by various jurisdictions (and
those proposed in the literature) take many forms. Unfortunately, nearly all
of these measures face either theoretical or pragmatic obstacles. Before
considering how the law might address the harms of street harassment, one
must consider the operation of the First Amendment.242 Street harassment is
an exercise of speech—an obnoxious, harmful exercise of speech, but
perhaps no more so than much political speech that falls squarely within the
heartland of the First Amendment’s protections against laws that would
regulate speech based on content.243 Any attempt to regulate speech purely
on the basis that it expresses a demeaning view of gender or sexualizes the
female identity would run into problems on this ground.
Nonetheless, the First Amendment provides no absolute protections.244
A state may regulate speech based on the time, place, or manner in which it
238

Davis, supra note 228, at 140 (citing Carole J. Sheffield, Sexual Terrorism: The
Social Control of Women, in ANALYZING GENDER 171, 171 (Beth B. Hess & Myra Marx
Ferree eds., 1987)).
239
Davis, supra note 228, at 140–41.
240
See Bowman, supra note 219, at 536.
241
KEARL, supra note 210, at 20.
242
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
243
The concept of content-neutrality has become the constitutional lodestar of the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Compare United States v. Playboy Ent.
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826–27 (2000) (invalidating, on the grounds that it regulated
speech based on content, the portions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring
cable companies to ensure that no unauthorized receipt of sexual images occurred), with Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20, 725–35 (2000) (upholding a law prohibiting protestors
from approaching within eight feet of someone outside of a health clinic, on the grounds that
the restrictions “apply equally to all protestors, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory
language makes no reference to the content of the speech”).
244
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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takes place, where the mode of expression is “basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”245 Such restrictions
will pass constitutional muster so long as they are: 1) content-neutral; 2)
narrowly tailored; 3) serve a significant state interest; and 4) leave open
alternative channels of communication.246 This framework is crucial to the
merits of the various proposed approaches to street harassment.
Consistent with that basic rule, certain categories of speech have been
found generally excluded from First Amendment protection. Miller v.
California created a community-based test for defining obscenity, allowing
states to regulate certain forms of extremely offensive speech.247 Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire recognized the so-called “fighting words” doctrine,
allowing states to prohibit a narrow category of abusive language likely to
contribute to a breach of the peace.248 As the Chaplinsky Court noted, “such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”249 In
Cohen v. California, the Court narrowed this test, clarifying that it applied
only to personal insults expressed to their target face-to-face, thereby
excluding communications that contribute to public discourse.250
Relatedly, the “true threats” doctrine excludes threats against another
person from the purview of the First Amendment.251 The Supreme Court,
though, has yet to fully settle whether, for constitutional purposes, a “true”
threat need be defined subjectively—based on the intent of the defendant—
or whether it is constitutionally permissible to punish someone for speech
that would be objectively threatening by the standards of a reasonable person,
in the absence of proof of intent.252
Beyond these categories, the First Amendment has not been held to bar
245

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 788–90, 791–803 (1989).
247
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). To pass the Miller test the state must show: 1) that the
average person, “applying [] community standards,” would find that the speech appeals to
the prurient interest; 2) that the work depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual acts or
excretory functions (as defined by state law); and 3) that the work, taken as a whole, lacks
political, artistic, or scientific value (as defined according to the standards of the U.S.
generally).
248
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
249
Id. at 572.
250
403 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1971).
251
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
252
See United States v. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005 (2015) (concluding, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, that a conviction for threatening someone over state lines, under
eighteen U.S.C. § 875(c), requires a showing of subjective intent, and thus declining to reach
the constitutional question).
246

SHELEY

496

6/5/18 1:52 PM

SHELEY

[Vol. 108

regulations in cases where speech is deeply intertwined with physical action,
such as under the laws of assault (discussed in detail in Section C.3, infra).
Similarly, the federal Civil Rights Act of 1968253 and the Matthew Shepard
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act together allow federal
prosecutors to charge defendants who injure or intimidate victims based on
race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.254 Such hate crimes laws have
resisted First Amendment scrutiny as they punish bias-motivated conduct—
including threats—as opposed to purely thoughts or words.255 Finally,
private suits for torts such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel,
slander, and the like do not generally run afoul of the First Amendment when
brought by private figures.256 The Supreme Court has, however, required that
“public” figures prove actual malice on the part of the defendant, in order to
protect political speech and satire.257
This quick overview highlights a couple of features of First Amendment
jurisprudence relevant to the various legal options for combatting street
harassment. Roughly speaking, there is leeway for punishing threatening or
genuinely dangerous behavior, particularly when directed at an individual, in
the absence of a broader political message. Yet speech falling short of these
categories may be protected from blanket exclusion. Against this backdrop,
I now consider several of the means by which street harassment might be
regulated.
1. Blanket Statutory Bans on Street Harassment
Many critics of street harassment have argued that jurisdictions should
draft new legislation specifically targeting street harassment as a distinct
practice.258 Currently, only one U.S. city, Kansas City, Missouri, has such
253

Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 74–75 (2013).
Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835 (2009).
255
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
256
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
257
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). See also Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443, 458–59 (2011) (holding that speech on a public sidewalk, about a public issue,
cannot be liable under an intentional infliction of emotional distress theory, even when the
speech is “outrageous”). The Court has not provided precise guidance on the definition of
“public figure.” See Kate M. Adams, (Re)defining Public Officials and Public Figures: A
Washington State Primer, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2000). The touchstone
appears to be whether an individual is involved in public affairs, as opposed to simply
involved in issues of public interest. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55
(1976) (holding for that reason that the wife of a wealthy businessman did not qualify as a
public figure requiring proof of actual malice).
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See, e.g., HOLLABACK!, http://www.ihollaback.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); Street
Harassment, ROGERS PARK YOUNG WOMEN’S ACTION TEAM, http://www.rogersparkywat.
org/street-harassment/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); STOP STREET HARASSMENT,
http://stopstreetharassment.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); Creating Safe Public Spaces, UN
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an ordinance, which makes it a crime to engage in behavior meant to threaten
or intimidate cyclists, pedestrians, and wheelchair users.259 The statute
prohibits not only threats but also lower-level behavior such as honking,
shouting, or “otherwise directing rude or unusual sounds” toward a victim.
However, it also includes the specific intent requirement that the perpetrator
have “the purpose of intimidating or injuring” the victim.260 For that reason,
proponents of broader “Safe Spaces” legislation argue that even the sui
generis Kansas City provision fails to capture much behavior that is actually
harmful toward women.261 Such scholars urge that new legislation targeting
street harassment should exclude specific intent requirements and require
only that the harasser intend to engage in the conduct itself.262
The problem, of course, is that in the absence of an intent requirement
it is difficult to draft a workable definition of street harassment that turns on
anything other than the content of the speech itself, thereby running afoul of
current First Amendment requirements. Bowman has argued that street
harassment is analogous to workplace sexual harassment prohibitions, upheld
as falling into the “captive audience” exception to the First Amendment.263
Yet she acknowledges that the Supreme Court might strike down street
harassment legislation under its decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which
declared unconstitutional a hate crimes ordinance that prohibited symbolic
expression “one knows or has reason to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, religion or gender.”264
In R.A.V., the Court held that, while the city could outlaw all “fighting
words,” it could not “regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards
the underlying message expressed.”265 If it is to avoid requiring the state to
prove a threatening purpose, any workable definition of street harassment
would seem to turn on whether the offending speech aroused gender-specific
feelings of sexual or bodily discomfort, which would fall exactly into the
category of content-based speech protected by R.A.V. The alternative,
banning all speech—or even all objectively upsetting speech—to strangers in
public places, would be content neutral but patently absurd.

WOMEN, http://unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/creating-safepublic-spaces (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
259
Kan. City, Mo., Ordinances ch. 50, art. VI, § 50-205 (2014), available at
https://library.municode.com/mo/kansas_city/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COORKA
MIVOII_CH50OFMIPR_ARTVIOFAGPUSA_S50-205HABIPEWHOP.
260
Id.
261
See, e.g., Roenius supra note 225, at 833.
262
Id. at 859. See also Bowman, supra note 219, at 574.
263
Bowman, supra note 219, at 544.
264
Id. at 546 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
265
Id. at 546–47 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377).
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Sopen Shah has argued that the most promising way around these
obstacles to statutory innovation may be the yet-underdeveloped “true
threats” doctrine.266 The Supreme Court has justified the “true threats”
exception as necessary “to protect[] individuals from the fear of violence”
and to prevent “the disruption that this fear engenders.”267 Shah concludes
that because fear is a reasonable, near-universal reaction to street harassment,
recognizing it as a true threat would be consistent with the purposes of the
exception.268 Unfortunately, because the Court has declined to determine
whether subjective intent to threaten is a necessary requirement for states to
punish such conduct, the doctrine leaves any potential prohibition vulnerable
if it lacks a subjective intent element. There is currently a circuit split on the
question.269
Finally, some states in fact punish speech under the “fighting words”
exception, for conduct tending to incite a breach of the peace in violation of
prohibitions sometimes known as “dueling statutes.”270 Yet such statutes do
not serve the same function as a general street harassment statute, as they
focus not on the harasser’s conduct but on the victim’s likely reactions to it.
Consistent with the stated purpose of the exception in Chaplinsky, the
question is whether the victim would be likely moved to violence by the
speech; as Bowman observes, even if we focus on the emotional distress
caused by fighting words, other than a purpose of keeping the peace, “the
assumption that outrage and injury is proved by evidence of violent reaction
simply does not fit women’s typical response to psychic injury.”271
Thus, the logic upon which courts reconcile fighting words statutes with
the First Amendment does not provide much traction for drafting a street
harassment prohibition.
2. Existing Harassment Statutes
While street harassment is a sui generis context which the vast majority
of jurisdictions have not addressed, a number of states and municipalities do

266
Sopen B. Shah, Open Season: Street Harassment as True Threats, 18 U. PA. J. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 377, 392–93 (2016).
267
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
268
Shah, supra note 266, at 394.
269
Id. at 395.
270
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-39-1 (2010) (criminalizing “[e]very person who
shall challenge another to fight a duel, or who shall send, deliver, or cause to be delivered,
any written or verbal message purporting or intended to be such challenge”); see also Calvert
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033,
1054 (1936).
271
Bowman, supra note 219, at 561.
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criminalize harassment in a public place.272 For example, Colorado’s
harassment statute, which is representative, states:
A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person,
he or she:
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical
contact; or
(b) In a public place directs obscene language or makes an obscene gesture to or at
another person; or
(c) Follows a person in or about a public place; or
...
(g) Makes repeated communications at inconvenient hours that invade the privacy of
another and interfere in the use and enjoyment of another’s home or private residence
or other private property; or
(h) Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively
coarse language to, another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly
273
response.

While some of these theories of liability initially seem applicable to
street harassment, they contain various requirements, common to other
states’ versions, which make them ill-suited to capturing much relevant
conduct of street harassers.274 Their reach is limited by 1) the requirement of
specific intent to harass; 2) the requirement, under most sub-sections, that the
offending behavior be repetitive; and 3) in sub-section (b), the requirement
that the content of the language meet the very high constitutional threshold
of obscenity. Furthermore, in a review of the case law construing such
statutes, Bowman notes that—while they almost certainly could be applied
to at least some forms of street harassment—few convictions have been
upheld, in part due to stated judicial reluctance to construe them so as to
criminalize behavior that is so common.275
It is clear that the attempt to punish street harassment as harassment has
been unfruitful within the framework of the First Amendment. And, while
tort liability offers some options for victims to seek redress as individuals,276
272

See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.1210 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-208 (2013); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 1311 (2007); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 711-1106 (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4 (LexisNexis
2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:33-4 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 2017);
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065 (2013).
273
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111.
274
See Bowman, supra note 219, at 556.
275
Id. at 558.
276
See Maeve Olney, Note, Toward a Socially Responsible Application of the Criminal
Law to the Problem of Street Harassment, 22 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 129, 150–51
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it does not serve the same expressive function as the criminal law, as
discussed in Part III. Part IV will develop a workable proposal for
prosecuting street harassment, instead, as simple assault, and will explore the
potential Broken Windows effects of such enforcement on the more serious
problem of sexual assault.
IV. COMBATTING SEXUAL ASSAULT THROUGH STREET HARASSMENT
ENFORCEMENT
Thus far, this article has identified two separate but related problems in
criminal justice: the expressive crisis in rape law and the lesser but significant
problem of rampant, yet largely legal, street harassment. In this Part, I argue
that prosecutors should turn their attention to street harassment in cases
where it violates existing laws. Not only can they do so constitutionally, but
in doing so they will, over time, prevent more serious, harder-to-prove crimes
of sexual assault.
A. STREET HARASSMENT AS ASSAULT

A person is typically guilty of assault when, “without lawful authority,
he or she knowingly engages in conduct which places another in reasonable
apprehension of receiving a battery.”277 As the definition of a battery
includes “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature,” it is clear that
the offence can include threatened, but uncompleted, physical contact short
of actual violence.278 Some states, such as New York, have narrowed that
common law understanding to require a showing of physical injury.279 Yet
such states generally penalize attempted unwanted touching under related
offenses such as menacing280 or attempted forcible touching.281 Furthermore,
all states but Mississippi and Idaho282 criminalize groping (and its attempt)
as a form of sexual or indecent assault.283 In short, through one or another
theory of assault, attempted assault, or attempted sexual assault, street
harassment violates these existing criminal laws on the occasions where the
perpetrator has the intent to touch or to put his victim in immediate
apprehension of unwanted touching.
(2015) (discussing the availability of tort remedies under theories of invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault).
277
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1 (2012).
278
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. STAT. 5/12-3.
279
N.Y. PENAL LAW 120.00(1) (2008).
280
Oregon Rev. STAT. § 2903.22 (2013).
281
N.Y. PENAL LAW 130.52 (2014).
282
Emily Shugerman, Two U.S. States Don’t Count Groping as a Crime, REVELIST
(Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.revelist.com/politics/legal-groping-united-states/6262.
283
See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (West 2010).
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While this admittedly captures only particularly egregious examples of
street harassment, it escapes the First Amendment problems that would arise
with a statute targeting harassment qua harassment: when accompanied by a
threat of physical contact harassment is no longer in the sphere of pure
speech. Indeed, prosecutors do, in some cases, already pursue the worst
forms of public groping, at least when there’s public demand. For example,
Washington, D.C. photographer Liz Gorman prompted public outrage at the
so-called Dupont Circle “bicycle groper,” who, after assaulting her, became
the target of an unusually thorough investigation and was ultimately
apprehended and convicted of four counts of sexual abuse.284 Credit for that
conviction goes to the police who spent many hours conducting witness
interviews and reviewing security footage, as well as to Gorman herself who,
having failed to chase her assailant down, called the police and wrote a blog
post that stirred up an outpouring of public response and new reports from
subsequent victims.285
Yet critics have pointed out that such prosecutions have been few and
far between for a number of reasons. 286 Two are substantive: the need to
prove the defendant’s intent to put the victim in apprehension of touching
and the reciprocal requirement that the victim’s fear of touching be
objectively reasonable.287 Certainly, even setting aside First Amendment
concerns, these difficulties are insurmountable in the vast majority of “hey
baby” situations, where the words alone do not trigger an apprehension of
touching but merely awareness of being observed. And they are, of course,
easily met (and irrelevant) in cases where actual groping occurs.
The difficult cases are in the middle ground. Suppose a man steps out
of the shadows while a woman is walking alone at night, moves aggressively
close to fall into step alongside her and hisses in her ear “I would fuck you
right now if I could.” One could argue that the harasser’s use of the
subjunctive tense evinces a lack of intent to follow through on the assault.
But at the same time, the speed with which he darted into the victim’s
personal space, the surprise element, the darkness, the intimations of barely
suppressed sexual violence all suggest beyond a reasonable doubt that he had
284

Peter Hermann, Bicycle Groper Pleads Guilty to August Attacks in Dupont Circle,
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/bicycle-groperpleads-guilty-to-august-attacks-in-dupont-circle/2012/11/08/7a06d34c-29f7-11e2-b4e0346287b7e56c_story.html?utm_term=.25e6f8229a1d.
285
Petula Dvorak, Dupont Circle Bicycle Groper Committed a Crime, not a
Misdemeanor, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dupontcircle-bicycle-groper-committed-a-crime-not-a-misdemeanor/2012/08/30/5febf118-f2de11e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.7f7b82b93013.
286
See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 219, at 549.
287
Id.
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at least knowledge that his behavior would put the victim in apprehension of
at least some form of unwanted touching. It is a basic principle of evidence
law that a factfinder may infer intent from a defendant’s actions.288 For
example, if the accused puts a gun to someone’s head and pulls the trigger, it
is hardly problematic to find him guilty of murder without delving deep into
his psyche to prove mens rea. When verbal street harassment is accompanied
by sudden physical movements, an element of surprise, and intimations of
real violence, fact-finders should be allowed similar inferences.
As to the element of the victim’s reasonableness, Cynthia Bowman
points out that the use of the “reasonable man” standard can thwart liability
due to the fact that male judges and lawyers do not see street harassment as
objectively intimidating.289 She is quite correct that “because of her constant
awareness of the violent consequences of male hostility to women and her
realistic fears of rape” even though “only a minority of harassment incidents
may lead to an ‘offensive touching,’ a reasonable woman cannot know which
will be the one.”290 Therefore, the attempt to use existing assault laws to
prosecute street harassment must be accompanied by both prosecutorial and
judicial awareness and appropriate jury instructions to the effect that
“reasonableness” include the general circumstances of both halves of the
population.291
With greater attention to how women may experience aggressive street
harassment, even short of physical touching, prosecutors can and should
bring many more charges against perpetrators of this middle category.
Setting aside broader Broken Windows effects, which the next two sections
discuss, the law of assault provides a limited, constitutional ground of
liability for the very real social, psychological, cultural, and physical injuries
street harassers impose on their victims and society in general. By ignoring
these injuries, prosecutors fail to protect the public interest in their charge.
Obviously, in a world of plea bargains and limited prosecutorial
resources, the charging decision drives who and what the justice system

288
See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) (approving jury
instruction allowing inference that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
his actions).
289
Bowman, supra note 219, at 553.
290
Id.
291
For a discussion of the gender implications of objective reasonableness standards in
the law, see Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching A Reasonable Woman Standard in
Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 769, 769 (2001) (noting that “one very standard
doctrinal move is to conceptualize reasonable care as that care shown by a ‘reasonable
person’ under like circumstances” and noting the paucity of case law taking into account
whether and how a reasonable man might differ from a reasonable woman).
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actually criminalizes.292 Expansive criminal codes give prosecutors massive
discretionary leeway, some of which they use at the macro to distinguish
“real” crimes as enforcement priorities, in contrast to “technical” crimes.293
To the extent that prosecutors take assault seriously as a crime, it is crucial
that they come to recognize assaultive street harassment as part of that
category of offenses, and prioritize it along with other crimes against the
body.
The literature on prosecutorial discretion suggests that charging
decisions often turn on such case-by-case factors as the defendant’s prior
record, the level of violence involved, and the intimacy between the
defendant and the accused (the last of which has been shown to cut against
enforcement).294 Other structural factors affecting charging decisions include
“perceived inconsistency between the law’s requirements and common sense
notions of justice” and “uncertainty regarding the impact of criminal
prosecutions on crime rates.”295 In considering how to apply the law with
“common sense,” prosecutors may in fact invoke “stereotypes or common
sense assumptions about crime and criminals that lead them to focus on some
offenses and offenders more than others.”296 To the extent that community
stereotypes about street harassment being harmless fun, or women inviting it
due to attire or geography, affect charging decisions in these cases,
prosecutors must seek to avoid them. Even the understanding of what
constitutes “violence” for charging purposes could be improved by increased
education about the nature and harms of street harassment.
Obviously, one of the most important criteria prosecutors use to
determine whether a case will move forward is the likelihood of
conviction.297 Prosecutors’ offices have formal charging policies, which
generally list likelihood of conviction as a significant factor in deciding how

292

See generally Bibas, supra note 119 (discussing the role of prosecutorial discretion in
charging).
293
See VERA INST. JUST., FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN
NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS xiii (rev. ed. 1981).
294
See W. BOYD LITTRELL, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND PLEA
BARGAINING 129–41 (1979); VERA INST. JUST., supra note 293, at 133; Kay L. Levine, The
Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape
Caseload, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 692–93 (2006).
295
Levine, supra note 294, at 698.
296
Myra Dawson, Rethinking the Boundaries of Intimacy at the End of the Century: The
Role of Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal Justice Decisionmaking Over Time, 38 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 105, 106 (2004).
297
Celesta Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 291, 311 (1982).
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to wield discretion and resources.298 Indeed, sociologist Lisa Frohmann has
found that prosecutors justify charging decisions based on predictions about
whether juries will empathize with the victim.299 Yet, as Frohmann suggests,
and as I discussed in the context of general sexual assault in Part I, when
prosecutors act based on these predictions, they are only reinforcing
stereotypes about gender-appropriate behavior and creating a class of people
who go under-protected.300 Indeed, the ABA’s standards for criminal justice
explicitly state that a prosecutor should give no weight, in charging, to his or
her own record of conviction.
It may well be the case that assault-based street harassment convictions
are challenging, for both the doctrinal and cultural reasons discussed above.
Yet prosecutors can and should use their discretion to combat the very
stereotypes that result in so much explicit and symbolic sexual violence
against women. And in any case, “charging policies tend to have little impact
on case-specific evaluations” but, rather, focus on offense categories
generally.301 As assault is a non-controversially significant offense category,
my proposal does not likely run afoul of charging polices, any more than it
does the First Amendment.
In addition to simply enforcing the laws of assault against assaultive
street harassment, prosecutors should engage in some kind of outreach to
advertise that fact. The D.C. bicycle groper was a perfect example of how
public outreach, by both the victim and the D.C. Metro Police, resulted in
more evidence: four new victims spoke out after Gorman’s blog post was
circulated and it became clear that the police were taking her allegations
seriously.302 While many episodes of assaultive street harassment occur so
quickly that they are difficult to report, if victims believe there is a point in
reporting, they will be more likely to do so, and the general public can assist
where appropriate.303
This Section has demonstrated that not only is it possible, doctrinally
298

Kenneth J. Mellili, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 669, 684.
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Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class,
and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 531, 536
(1997).
300
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Mellili, supra note 298, at 683.
302
Dvorak, supra note 285.
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In a recent New Yorker article, Syracuse University Professor Mary Karr describes
how she was nearly deterred from reporting a man who had grabbed her crotch in broad
daylight on a New York City street by the potential futility, but how after overcoming those
concerns, she succeeded in getting him arrested. Mary Karr, The Crotchgrabber, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/thecrotchgrabber.
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and pragmatically, to use existing laws to pursue the most severe cases of
street harassment, but also that there are important reasons for doing so. The
most important reason, however, relates to the factor of violence in
influencing charging decisions. While episodes like the ones described in
this Section do not involve physical injury or high-level violence, they are
significant due to their relationship to more extreme forms of violence. In
the following Sections, I will argue that prosecutors should take into account
the likely Broken Windows effect of charging assaultive street harassers on
the most severe forms of sexual violence against women.
B. THE STRONG BROKEN WINDOWS EFFECT

As discussed in Part II, the empirical literature on Broken Windows
policing remains mixed. Yet at least some research suggests it does indeed
have what I will refer to as the “strong” effect: in some cases enforcing laws
against lower-level crimes appears to modestly but statistically significantly
reduce more serious offenses.304 Most significantly, Anthony Braga and
Brenda Bond found such positive effects to be correlated with community
involvement in policing, emphasizing the need for a “tradition of stable
relationships [between the police and] the community and responsiveness to
local concerns.”305
If Broken Windows can even modestly reduce violent crime through
targeting completely unrelated misdemeanors, it stands to reason that it could
be even more powerful at reducing serious sex crimes when applied to lower
level sexually based offenses like assaultive street harassment. Both from
the perspective of victims (for whom street harassment is the regular
manifestation of fears about more serious sexual assault) and perpetrators,
who participate in, and are emboldened by, the same culture of physical
sexual violation as rapists, the two categories of conduct go hand in hand.
The victims’ perspective is not simply relevant symbolically: we know that
many victims decide not to report sexual assault due to a fear that the justice
system will not help them.306 It stands to reason that the state cracking down
on assaultive street harassment will serve a pragmatic expressive purpose, as
evidence that the system does care about punishing sexual violations. And
to the extent that Broken Windows theory works best where the police and
community cooperate with one another, the public nature of street harassment
is a ripe context for such cooperation.
Furthermore, pursuing street harassment may be much easier, from an

304
305
306

See supra notes 144–156 and accompanying text.
Braga & Bond, supra note 166, at 600.
See supra Section I.D; see also supra notes 17–19.
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evidentiary standpoint, than pursuing sexual assault. Many sexual assaults
occur behind closed doors, which poses evidentiary challenges for
prosecutors and factfinders, who must ensure that the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is met. Even if the system works harder, as it
should, to aggressively pursue sexual assault cases in the face of various
cultural rape myths, there will necessarily be fewer convictions than
warranted. Street assault occurs in broad daylight, often in situations with
many witnesses. It does not involve expensive DNA evidence and, because
it is nearly always between strangers, presents few if any defenses that the
victim consented to the assault. While the problem of under-reporting is
likely as big or bigger than in rape cases, prosecutors and police can combat
that through greater public outreach. In sum, assaultive street harassment is
low-hanging fruit. If the strong version of Broken Windows theory is correct,
and there are good reasons to believe it might be in this context, we can
reduce rape and more extreme versions of sexual assault by targeting this
behavior when it meets the legal definition of assault.
C. THE WEAK BROKEN WINDOWS EFFECT

Let us assume for a moment that the strong version of Broken Windows
is ineffective. Perhaps all we get by punishing broken windows is fewer
broken windows. Even then, that “aesthetic” effect is uniquely important and
effective in cases of sexual assault. As discussed in Section I.B, the
substantive definition of sexual assault is in transition. There is growing
social and psychological awareness that a mere lack of physical force does
not render sex consensual, due to the many reasons a woman might have for
failing to physically resist. Yet the literature suggests that neither
enforcement nor popular belief has caught up to this understanding. Rape
mythology persists and charging decisions and jury verdicts replicate it. To
use Adam Samaha’s “clock” model of policy-making, we can say that when
it comes to the definition of sexual assault, we lack a stable, shared meaning
for the term “noon.” As a society, we need to come to a shared formal
understanding that tracks with the reality of how rape truly occurs. We need
a “clock” that tells would-be perpetrators that their default posture should be
to leave a woman alone.
Given the expressive crisis surrounding sexual assault enforcement,
aggressively prosecuting assaultive street harassment will have the Broken
Windows effect Samaha attributes to the clock: it will serve as an aesthetic
mechanism for coordinating the minds of all of the citizens to create the
relevant reality.307 We need a reality in which a woman’s body and sexual
307

Samaha, supra note 144, at 1584–85.
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identity are not considered a resource for the male population unless they
explicitly say otherwise. And we need substantive legal definitions of rape,
enforcement patterns, and jury verdicts to reflect this unitary reality. In short,
enforcing assault laws to create a legal reality of presumed bodily freedom
from assaultive harassment at the street level will contribute to more stable
definitions of assault and consent systemically. In addition to the benefits for
actual prosecution of rapists, such a policy would reduce the expressive
failures that have led many women to feel alienated and unprotected by our
laws.
That said, there is a secondary expressive benefit to this sort of Broken
Windows effect. In Section II.C, I explored the ways in which widespread
condemnation of “rape culture” has been a double-edged sword. Defining so
much of male conduct as rape-supportive risks creating a black and white
dichotomy in public discourse between either denying that rape culture exists
at all or branding anything and everything as part of it at a cost to actual crime
victims.308 It has also, as mentioned, created a cultural narrative about
campus rape that may not only compromise notions of due process in those
cases but de-emphasize the more pervasive problem outside of campuses.309
Should prosecutors begin to charge street harassment as assault, they
would serve a useful secondary expressive function: applying the law with
precision to designate the most troubling conduct as illegal. The proposals
for new legislation specifically targeting harassment not only run afoul of the
First Amendment but also risk further intensifying the polarized cultural
debate over acceptable male behavior. Indeed, female respondents to at least
one 2000 study generally opposed straightforward legislation against speechbased street harassment on a number of grounds, including concerns for their
own autonomy, should the state step in to defend them against such a
common problem.310 An assault-based approach holds the promise of
common ground, and of workable, fixed rules that can combat antiquated
beliefs about female sexual availability without entering the domain of witch
hunts, gender wars, or excessive state intrusion into cultural life.
308
James Hamblin makes this point nicely, noting “incendiary as reactions on the topic
can be, though, at least some of the polarization is media spectacle. Ultimately, everyone
wants the same thing: no rape. Positing choices between prosecuting rapists or fixing
systems and realigning expectations, between the rights of one gender and the other, thwarts
progress.” James Hamblin, How Not to Talk About the Culture of Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/how-not-to-talk-aboutthe-culture-of-sexual-assault/359845/.
309
See Volokh, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
310
Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of
Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1076–80
(2000).
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D. POTENTIAL CONCERNS FOR APPLICATION

I have already addressed many of the common arguments against
prosecuting street harassment in and of itself.311 And I have reviewed the
empirical criticism of Broken Windows as an enforcement practice generally
and argued that, even if the staunchest critics are correct, it nonetheless holds
unique promise in the sexual assault context.312 Yet applying Broken
Windows in the specific manner I suggest may attract a few additional
objections.
Most importantly, the specter of race-based enforcement—already welldocumented in current Broken Windows policing313—may be even more of
a problem when we use it to address such a ubiquitous form of behavior,
particularly in urban spaces. As William Stuntz has observed of vice crimes,
due to the impossibility of policing all qualifying behavior, the decision to
investigate is the primary determinant of who gets punished.314 It cannot be
emphasized enough that any effort to operationalize this proposal must be
accompanied by additional scrutiny to ensure even-handed enforcement.
And the proposed limitation on enforcement to only those cases that meet the
elements of assault—as opposed to adopting a generalized harassment statute
—goes a long way toward limiting illegitimate discretion.315 Furthermore,
unlike drug use, prostitution, sodomy, or other offenses that have, in the past,
been only selectively enforced to target either certain individuals or groups,
street harassment has both a victim and, usually, third-party witnesses. The
need for these actors’ involvement before an investigation can even take
place is another important limit on police and prosecutorial abuse.
Furthermore, street harassment—due in part to its very ubiquity—tracks
somewhat less with socio-economic conditions than other misdemeanor
offenses like vandalism and petty theft.316 Critics of the now-famous
“Hollaback!” video made by filmmaker Bob Bliss point out the racially
fraught implications of the fact that he documented ten hours of primarily
minority men harassing a white woman, suggesting that the moment of
feminist backlash against such conduct was motivated by implicit racism or

311

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section II.A–C.
313
See e.g., Fagan & Garth, supra note 173.
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See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1875 (2000); see
also Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 159 (2014)
(arguing that selective media reporting of uniquely high sanctions against particular
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classism.317 But evidence suggests that street harassment is a problem that
transcends class and race. In a 1984 study, sociologists Cheryl Benard and
Edit Schlaffer, acting as their own guinea pigs on the streets, reported that
age, education, and income bore little relation to harassing behavior
(although younger men tended to be more aggressive, and older men tended
to lower their voices).318 And, indeed, the Office of Civil Rights’ campaign
against campus sexual assault is only a part of a generalized campaign against
sexual harassment.319 Whatever the constitutional merits of OCR’s approach
to combatting the problem, its involvement has clearly emphasized that
young, educated men form a high-priority part of it. Because street
harassment occurs anywhere and everywhere320—as does the sexual assault
this article’s theory of Broken Windows targets—it can and should be
enforceable in a racially just manner.
CONCLUSION
On January 21, 2017, the day after Donald Trump’s inauguration,
hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered to participate in the Women’s
March in Washington, D.C.321 While the gathering—joined by parallel
demonstrations in most major U.S. cities and around the world—was a
widespread reaction to many values already expressed by the then-Presidentelect, the women’s rights focus of the March originated with his casual boast
that when “you’re a star,” you can “do anything” to women, even “grab them
by the pussy.”322 In a world where a candidate for President of the United
States gets elected after openly endorsing sexual assault, and in doing so
galvanizes the largest day of protests in U.S. history, it is unsurprising that
every aspect of sexual assault enforcement is at an expressive crossroads.
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This article provides a moderate proposal to decrease sexual assault by
applying the lessons learned from Broken Windows policing to the related
problem of assaultive street harassment. Due to the cyclical relationship
between appearance and reality, which appears to contribute to rapes being
under-reported, under-investigated, and under-prosecuted, it is clear that the
criminal justice system is failing at its expressive functions, with significant
consequences for substantive justice. If the “strong” view of Broken
Windows works, then by targeting street harassment as assault we can reduce
much harder-to-prove sexual assaults over time. Yet even if only the “weak”
view of Broken Windows applies, we can still make substantial strides
towards resolving the expressive crisis over the definitions of sexual assault
and consent. Such enforcement would disrupt the cultural norm of default
male access to female bodies in a manner less polarizing than that of the
current extra-legal critique of “rape culture.” In either case, it would also
encourage more victims to report sexual assaults of all varieties by expressing
that the state cares about prosecuting sex offenses. All of these effects would
serve, directly or indirectly, to reduce the incidence of sexual assault. Either
way, prosecutors and courts need to think about the big-picture relationship
between street harassment and sexual assault and enforce existing laws with
an eye toward this connection.

